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Currency undervaluation is a well-known and commonly used method for stimulating economic growth. Although the exact effects 
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unquestionable. This thesis departs from the generally accepted truth that an undervalued currency functions in practice as a 
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and its implications, the thesis provides a cursory glance at the development of international obligations regarding currencies and 
exchange rates. 
 
The second part deals shortly with the relevant provisions of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement and the shortcomings related thereto. 
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unlikely case that the IMF were to reach the decision that one of its members was in breach of this Article, it has no effective dis-
pute settlement system it could avail itself of if the said member state did not comply with the IMF’s recommendations to remove 
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With the IMF being unable to effectively deal with the issue, the attention of politicians and academics alike has turned to the WTO, 
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interpretation of these provisions could in theory be stretched in order to cover currency undervaluation, the WTO cannot at pre-
sent provide a sustainable answer to the issue of currency undervaluation. 
 
This thesis argues that the problems in adjudicating currency manipulation essentially arise from historical developments and the 
failure to adapt the instruments of international law to a new economic reality. This, together with the fear of overlapping jurisdic-
tions between international institutions, has led to a loophole in international economic law. Initially the division of authority be-
tween the WTO and the IMF was clear: exchange rate issues under the par value system were a matter to be dealt with exclusively 
within the IMF. After the breakdown of the par value system, misuse of monetary policies became easier and more frequent, but 
nothing was done to reinforce the authority of the IMF. This has led to a situation where the IMF has the jurisdiction to deal with 
exchange rate issues, but lacks an effective enforcement mechanism to ensure that its rulings are followed. The WTO on the other 
hand has at its disposal an extremely effective dispute resolution mechanism but lacks jurisdiction regarding currency issues. 
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1 Introduction 
Currency undervaluation is a well-known and commonly used method for stimulating 
economic growth. Such a currency policy functions in practice as a subsidy to exports and 
tariff on imports. As  ar  ac  as the 193 ’s  curre c   e a uati    as use     states i  
order to promote exports that would stimulate growth and help them out of recession. At 
the time, devaluations developed into a beggar-thy-neighbour -policy, leading to a spiral of 
competitive devaluations that did little to help states recover from the Great Depression.
1
  
The lessons learned during the Great Depression and its aftermath led to the establishment 
of the Bretton Woods system, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and what 
went on to become the World Bank. A failed attempt at establishing the International 
Trade Organization resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which became the foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) when it came into 
existence in 1995. In joining these institutions, states agreed to limit their sovereignty over 
trade-related and monetary affairs in order to prevent the likes of the Great Depression 
from happening again. Ironically, as will be examined in this paper, the IMF and WTO 
essentially lack the ability to effectively prevent currency manipulation, despite the 
original rationale lying behind their establishment. 
The situation in the first decades of the 21
st
 century is quite different from that of the 
193 ’s, and countries are unlikely to use competitive devaluation as a tool even during 
global economic crises, foremost because they now have a much wider set of tools 
available to promote economic recovery.
2
 However, what could be considered the 
contemporary equivalent of competitive devaluations is the act of intervening heavily on 
the currency market with the aim of preventing a currency from appreciating. This method 
is used by a number of countries to this day. Although various countries (e.g. India, Brazil, 
Indonesia, and Japan) have intervened in the exchange market or applied capital controls in 
order to prevent the appreciation of their currencies,
3
 the case of the Chinese yuan is by far 
the most famous, and will for this reason be used as a an example throughout this paper. 
                                                 
1
 Beckington, Jeffrey S. and Amon, Matthew R.: ‘Competitive Currency Depreciation - The Need for a More 
Effective International Legal Regime’  10 Journal of International Business & Law 209 (2011) at 209. 
2
 Ahamed, Liaquat: ‘Currency Wars, Then and Now’, 90 Foreign Affairs 92 (2011) at 100-101. 
3
 Clines, William R. and Williamson, John: ‘Currency Wars’, Peterson Institute for International Economics 
Number PB10-26 (11/2010) at 1; see also Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘E cha  e Rate Misa i   e t a d 
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The Pe   e’s De  cratic Re u  ic    Chi a  “Chi a”  a   ie  a  ua  e cha  e rate re i e 
until 1994, when it unified its exchange rates into one, which was pegged to the dollar at 
the value of 8.28 RMB per USD.
4
 In 2005, China announced it would end the peg, 
appreciate the yuan by 2 per cent and switch to a managed float in which the value of the 
renminbi was tied to a basket of currencies, not the dollar alone.
5
 Although this reform 
allowed for the renminbi to appreciate by 20 per cent by the year 2008, numerous 
economists and politicians argue that the exchange rate is still significantly undervalued 
due t  the hea   i ter e ti  s    the Pe   e’s Ba   of China on the market.6 
The u  er a ue   ua   u cti  s as a cata  st   r Chi a’s e   rt-driven economic growth, 
simultaneously discouraging imports by making them expensive. Thanks to its currency 
policy, by the end of the year 2013, China had accumulated foreign currency reserves 
worth 3.66 trillion USD.
7
 The huge economic imbalances caused by this surplus have 
caused concern in the international community and during the last ten years, academics, 
economists and politicians in the United States and all over the world have debated on 
what could, and what should, be done about the situation. Suggestions have varied from 
diplomatic consultations and unilaterally imposed countervailing duties to a full-blown 
dispute settlement procedure under the WTO. Despite the vigorous debate and even a 
number of legislative and administrative initiatives in the United States, so far no real 
action has been taken.
8
 
This paper uses the method of legal dogmatics to analyze how currency undervaluation can 
be assessed under international law, focusing on the examination of whether invoking the 
provisions of the IMF Articles of Agreement or WTO agreements to challenge currency 
undervaluation could be successful. In order to understand the issues behind this question, 
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the first part of the paper provides a short overview of the history of international 
regulation of currencies and the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods system. The second part 
deals shortly with the relevant IMF provisions and the shortcomings related thereto, after 
which the relationship between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organization is examined. The third part of the paper aims to provide an in-depth analysis 
of the WTO provisions that are most probably to be invoked with the aim of curbing 
currency undervaluation: Article XV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the provisions on subsidies. Before presenting its conclusions, the last part of 
the paper provides a cursory review of the solutions that have been proposed in order to 
address problem of currency undervaluation and the trade distortions caused by it. 
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2 Monetary Sovereignty 
2.1 The Principle of Monetary Sovereignty 
O e    the ai  reas  s  h  USA has  ee  re ucta t t   irect   cha  e  e Chi a’s 
currency policy is that currency arrangements are a delicate political subject, due to the 
long-established principle of monetary sovereignty. Strangely enough, this principle has 
not been expressly recognized in any instrument of international law, not even in the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
9
 However, it has been affirmed 
as a general principle of international law by the Permanent International Court of Justice 
in the Serbian Loans case  i   hich it  as state  that it is a “ e era    acce te   ri ciple 
that a State is e tit e  t  re u ate its     curre c ” 10 According to the principle of 
monetary sovereignty, each state has the exclusive right to issue currency, determine and 
change the value of that currency and regulate the use of that currency and any other 
currency within the limits of its territory.
11
 For this reason, a state can freely depreciate its 
curre c   ith ut c   itti   a  “i ter ati  a   r   ” u  er cust  ar  i ter ati  a  
law.
12
 
This right to exert exclusive legal control over its currency can be limited by the state itself 
only by entering into international agreements in which it agrees to surrender parts of this 
right.
13
 An international legal monetary framework was first developed during the years 
between the two World Wars,
14
 and the first attempts to regulate monetary affairs on an 
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international level were limited to declarations and loose agreements of a soft nature.
15
 
When these instruments failed to bring about the desired effect of stabilizing the 
international economy, states took further steps in limiting their monetary sovereignty and 
as a consequence the IMF was created in 1944.
16
 
2.2 The Bretton Woods System 
With the introduction of the Bretton Woods system, states were imposed with three hard 
obligations concerning monetary policy: the obligation to maintain par values and a unified 
exchange rate regime as well as the prohibition to introduce restrictions on current 
accounts. The obligation to maintain a unified exchange rate regime is still in force (Article 
VIII Section 3), as is the obligation to avoid restrictions on current payments (Article VIII 
Section 2). Ironically, the most well-known of these obligations, the par value system, 
turned out to be the biggest failure and was officially ended in 1977 when the Second 
Amendment t  the   ter ati  a  M  etar   u  ’s Artic es    A ree e t e tere  i t  
force. 
Under the par value system, states were obliged to set a pegged rate, or “par value”, for 
their national currency (in relation to the US dollar), and intervene in the currency markets 
i   r er t   ee  e cha  e rate   uctuati  s  ithi  a  i ite  ‘ a  ’  The value of the US 
dollar in turn was tied to gold. States were allowed to adjust the par value of their currency 
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by following certain established procedures when this was necessary for the correction of a 
‘ u  a e ta   isequi i riu ’ i  their  a a ce     a  e ts, but only with the permission of 
the IMF.
17
 Seasonal, cyclical temporary changes in the equilibrium of a currency were not 
considered justification for a change in the par va ue    a state’s currency. The provisions 
of the original IMF Articles of Agreement therefore functioned in such a manner that the 
relationships between currencies of different states remained fixed, with gold as the 
common denominator.
18
 
The Articles of Agreement of the IMF constituted a turning point in the history of 
international monetary affairs because, as Simmons puts it, it was the first time that the 
international community explicitly recognized that exchange rates were a matter of 
international concern.
19
 From an issue left completely to each state’s own discretion, 
exchange arrangements thus became a matter closely regulated by the international 
community.
20
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3 Limitations on Exchange Arrangements Set in the IMF Articles of Agreement 
3.1 The End of the Bretton Woods System 
By the end of the sixties, the exchange rate of the US dollar was grossly overvalued, and in 
1971 the     ar’s c   erti i it  t        as e  e   This ar e  the e   t  the  ar  a ue 
system and by 1973 most major currencies were allowed to float freely against each other. 
This led to the amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement in 1977 and the 
establishment of the current obligations of IMF members with regards to their currency 
policy. According to Article IV Section 2(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement, states are 
allowed to freely choose the currency arrangement they want to implement. In practice, 
states can choose from a wide range of exchange rate regimes: a currency can be allowed 
t     at  ree    r it ca   e tie   ‘ e  e ’  t  another currency or basket of currencies, or the 
state can even choose to use the currency of another state. The only absolute limitation is 
that the state may not determine the value of its currency in terms of gold.  
In addition to the limitation regarding gold, the IMF Articles of Agreement include only 
t   restricti  s    the states’ ri ht t   eter i e the  a ue    their curre c    irst    IMF 
members shall not introduce or maintain multiple currency practices.
21
 Secondly, members 
shall not manipulate exchange rates in order to prevent effective adjustment of balance of 
payments or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.
22
 
These amendments arose from the recognition that the stability of the international 
monetary system cannot be achieved by stabilizing exchange rates themselves, but rather 
requires that exchange rates adjust in response to underlying conditions in the economy. 
The rigidity of the par value system had led to disequilibrium in the international economy, 
because states no longer adjusted their currencies in response to changes in the economy, 
therefore either delaying or completely preventing balance of payments adjustments 
between states.
23
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3.2 IMF Article IV(1)(iii): Exchange Rate Manipulation 
According to Article IV(1)(iii) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, each member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary 
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair 
competitive advantage over other members. This obligation comprehends the maintaining 
of both an undervalued and an overvalued exchange rate. Unlike the other obligations set 
in Article IV(1), which deal with domestic policies, this is   e    a ‘har ’  ature  setting a 
clear prohibition, which reflects the fact that exchange rate regimes are of concern to the 
international community.
24
 
The phrase “ a i u ati      e cha  e rates” is not defined in the article or elsewhere in 
the Articles of Agreement.
25
 The  M ’s    7 Decisi      Bilateral Surveillance over 
Members, however, provides further guidance on the meaning of this phrase.
26
 Section 15 
of the Decision provides that the following developments could be indications that a 
member state is manipulating its exchange rate in the sense of Article IV(1)(iii): 
(i) protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange 
market; 
(ii) official or quasi-official borrowing that either is unsustainable or brings 
unduly high liquidity risks, or excessive and prolonged official or quasi-
official accumulation of foreign assets, for balance of payments purposes; 
(iii)  (a) the introduction, substantial intensification, or prolonged 
maintenance, for balance of payments purposes, of restrictions on, or 
incentives for, current transactions or payments, or 
(b) the introduction or substantial modification for balance of 
payments purposes of restrictions on, or incentives for, the inflow or 
outflow of capital; 
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(iv) the pursuit, for balance of payments purposes, of monetary and other 
financial policies that provide abnormal encouragement or discouragement 
to capital flows; 
(v) fundamental exchange rate misalignment; 
(vi) large and prolonged current account deficits or surpluses; and 
(vii) large external sector vulnerabilities, including liquidity risks, arising 
from private capital flows.
27
 
The Annex of the Decision also deals with currency manipulation and Article IV(1)(iii). 
Secti        the A  e  states that “[A] member would only be acting inconsistently with 
Article IV, Section 1(iii) if the Fund determined both that: (a) the member was 
manipulating its exchange rate or the international monetary system and (b) such 
manipulation was being carried out for one of the two purposes specifically identified in 
Artic e  V  Secti   1 iii ”, i.e. prevention of the effective adjustment of balance of 
payments or the gaining of an unfair competitive advantage over other members. Article 
IV(1)(iii) is therefore composed of two elements, an objective and a subjective element, 
both of which must be fulfilled in order for a breach of the article to be established.  
The objective element is fulfilled by the existence of official interventions which affect the 
exchange rate. According to the interpretation of Article IV(1)(iii), manipulation of the 
exchange rate can happen through interventions in exchange markets and/or by imposing 
capital controls. Currency manipulation covers not only scenarios in which interventions 
are aimed at moving the exchange rate in either direction, but also those in which the intent 
of the government is to prevent such movement.
28
 
The fulfillment of the objective element alone gives little indication of whether a currency 
is being manipulated in the sense of Art. IV(1)(iii). Indeed, the maintaining of a pegged 
exchange rate requires constant and possibly even heavy intervention in the currency 
market, and yet it is completely legitimate under the IMF Articles of Agreement. Moreover 
the    i ati   t  “ r   te sta i it       steri   … a   etar  s ste  that   es   t 
produce erratic disru ti  s” as  ai   ut i  Art   V 1  ii    u   see  t  require 
interventions in certain situations regardless of the exchange rate regime chosen by the 
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state.
29
 E cha  e rate isa i   e t ca  a s   e “the u i te  e  si e e  ect    
macroeconomic policies aimed at achieving domestic objectives or the result of distortions 
i  the i ter ati  a   i a cia  architecture  r i     estic structura  c   iti  s”.30 The 
concept of currency manipulation has been worded in such a broad manner that practically 
all countries could be said to be constantly manipulating their currencies. For this reason 
 reat  ei ht is  ut    the  hrase “i   r er t ” a   the su jecti e e e e t it introduces into 
the provision. 
In order to fulfill the subjective element of Article IV(1)(iii), it must be established that the 
state in question has manipulated its currency for the purpose of preventing effective 
balance of payments or gaining an unfair competitive advantage over other member states. 
This requires a determination of the intent of the state. The state is required to give its 
explanation for the interventions and it is given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. 
However, it is ultimately up to the  u   t  a e a  i  e e  e t assess e t    the state’s 
i te t  ta i   i t  acc u t “a   a ai a  e a   re e a t i   r ati   re ar i   the e  er’s 
e cha  e rate    ic ”.31 
It is the establishment of this subjective element that makes the application of Article 
IV(1)(iii) problematic. The macroeconomic effects of exchange rate policies are equivocal 
and complicated, and accordingly the reasons for maintaining a certain exchange rate 
policy can vary greatly from state to state. In its over 30-year history of bilateral 
surveillance regarding Article IV (consisting of over 40,000 consultations), the IMF has 
never found a single state to manipulate its currency in the sense of Article IV(1)(iii),
32
 and 
it is highly unlikely to do so in the near future. The issue of currency manipulation, in 
 articu ar the esta  ish e t    a state’s i te t  is a atter    such political delicacy that it 
renders the application of Article IV(1)(iii) extremely difficult (if not impossible) in 
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practice. As state     Zi  er a    “the require e t    i te t re  ers the  e   r  isi   
   the  M ’s c  e    c   uct esse tia    i   erati e”.33 
Moreover, even if the IMF was to reach the decision that one of its members was in breach 
of Article IV(1)(iii), it has no effective dispute settlement system it could avail itself of if 
the sai  e  er state  i    t c       ith the  M ’s rec   e  ations to remove the 
breach. The  u  ’s   ti  s are  i ite  t  the  ec arati      i e i i i it  t  use the  u  s’ 
resources, suspension of voting rights or expulsion from the IMF. In the case of important 
economic and political powers such as China, Japan and the United States, such threats are 
as good as empty.
34
 
It is for these reasons that academics, economists and politicians have turned to the WTO 
in the hope that its agreements, along with its effective dispute settlement mechanism, 
might provide a solution to this apparent loophole in international economic law. 
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4 The IMF-WTO Relationship 
4.1 The Effects of Exchange Rate Arrangements on International Trade 
Although the exact effects of exchange rate arrangements on international trade are highly 
debated, the fact that strong interlinkages between the two exist is unquestionable. During 
the last couple of decades, the debate has shifted from the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on trade to the trade effects of exchange rate misalignment, i.e. exchange rate 
undervaluation or overvaluation.
35
 The economics behind the effects of exchange rate 
misalignment have been the subject of many studies in the last couple of decades.
36
 
For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to go into the macroeconomic theories 
behind exchange rate misalignment. It is sufficient to state that a generally accepted truth is 
that an undervalued currency functions as a de facto tariff-cum-subsidy. A weak currency 
makes exports cheap and thereby incentivizes companies to export their products instead of 
selling them on the domestic market. Simultaneously, it makes imports relatively 
expensive, since more units of the domestic currency are needed for each unit of foreign 
currency. This functions as a de facto tariff on imports, which raises the prices of imported 
products    the c u tr ’s domestic market, causing demand to fall and ultimately limiting 
the quantity of imports. 
In short, currency manipulation makes it possible for WTO members to circumvent their 
obligations under the WTO agreements by nullifying, or at least diminishing, the effects of 
tariff concessions and eluding the prohibition on granting export subsidies.
37
 
4.2 Cooperation Prior to the WTO 
These interconnections were recognized already when the Bretton Woods System was born 
decades before the establishment of the WTO, and consequently cooperation between 
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organizations or regimes governing issues related to international trade and finance was 
seen as an inevitable condition for a balanced global economy. Article I(ii) of the IMF 
Articles of Agreement states as one of the purposes of the Fund the facilitation of the 
“e  a si   a    a a ce   r  th    i ter ati  a  tra e”   A  a ree e t    “Re ati  s 
 et ee   TO a    M ”  as  ra te     the   teri  C   issi     r the  TO i  194   This 
agreement set the obligation to consult between the two organizations, defined a 
coordinated policy and provided the institutional framework to enable this. However, since 
the ITO never came into existence, no formal agreement between trade and monetary 
organizations was needed and the agreement was never entered into.  Since the GATT was 
only a multilateral treaty and established no international organization, it was deemed 
sufficient that a statutory link with the IMF was incorporated into the agreement. 
38
 
This  i    et ee  the t   s ste s  as  r  i e  i  the GATT i   r er t  “ eutra ize” the 
problem of overlapping and possibly contradictory regulation. Article XV(1) of the GATT 
 r  i es that “the c  tracti    arties sha   see  c -operation with the International 
Monetary Fund to the end that the contracting parties and the Fund may pursue a 
coordinated policy with regard to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund 
and questions of quantitative restrictions and other trade measures within the jurisdiction of 
the c  tracti    arties ” The artic e  arts  r   the  resu   siti   that e cha  e easures 
are within the jurisdiction of the IMF whereas trade measures are within the jurisdiction of 
the GATT  Artic e XV 4    es    t  state that “C  tracting parties shall not, by exchange 
action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the 
i te t    the  r  isi  s    the Artic es    A ree e t    the   ter ati  a  M  etar   u   ”  
The question of jurisdiction between the two systems therefore boils down to the 
i ter retati      the ter s “e cha  e acti  ” a   “tra e acti  ”   hich  esse tia     are 
two sides of the same coin. The 1981 case regarding Italian deposit schemes is a perfect 
example of this. 
The issue raised in this case was whether the Italian import deposit scheme constituted a 
charge on importation or a charge on the transfer of payments and consequently, did it fall 
under the jurisdiction of the GATT (and therefore constitute a violation of Article II) or 
under the jurisdiction of the IMF (in which case there could be no violation of the GATT). 
The Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions made the following analysis: 
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“   the  isti cti    et ee  i   rt a    a  e ts easures  ere a e    
taking into account the purpose or the effect of the action, the Italian scheme 
would probably be both a trade and an exchange measure: it is intended to 
improve Italy's payments position as well as to restrain imports, and it has 
had an impact both on payments for imports and the imports themselves. If 
however the distinction were made by looking at the restrictive technique 
used, the Italian deposit scheme would probably have to be regarded as an 
exchange measure since it is formulated and operated as a requirement to be 
 u  i  e    r the  urchase      rei   e cha  e rather tha    r i   rtati   ”39 
The difficulty of this distinction is illustrated well by the following statement of a special 
sub-group set in 1954 during the Review Session, to which the Balance-of-Payments 
C   ittee a s  re ers t  i  the  ta ia  case: “i  a   i sta ces it  as  i  icu t  r 
impossible to define clearly whether a government measure is financial or trade in 
character a    reque t   it is   th” 40 The sub-group however went on to note that the 
 i isi        r   et ee  the c  tracti    arties a   the  u    as i   ractice “ ase     
the technical nature of government measures rather than on the effect of these measures on 
i ter ati  a  tra e a    i a ce” 41 Despite this finding, the conclusion of the Committee in 
the 1981 case of Italy is that the contracting parties to the GATT have never decided 
whether distinguishing between trade and financial measures should be based on the 
effects and purpose of the measure or the actual technique by which it is implemented. The 
a  r ach u  er the GATT has  ee  “t  e a i e  articu ar restricti e easures a  ecti   
tra e i  e e  e t    the   r  that the easures t   ” 42 
The same sub- r u ’s re  rt the C   ittee    Ba a ce-of-Payments Restrictions also 
states that “the  re i   rta t  r   e   as   t that     e i i   the res ecti e 
jurisdictions of the contracting parties and the Fund but that of establishing more effective 
 achi er    r c  su tati   i  acc r a ce  ith Artic e XV ”43 
                                                 
39
 Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Consultation with Italy (Deposit Requirement for 
Purchase of Foreign Currency), Background note by the Secretariat, 25 September 1981, BOP/W/51 at ¶9. 
40
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Consultation with Italy (Deposit Requirement for 
Purchase of Foreign Currency), Background note by the Secretariat, 25 September 1981, BOP/W/51 at  ¶11. 
41
 GATT Analytical Index on Article XV at 435 (italics added). 
42
 Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Consultation with Italy (Deposit Requirement for 
Purchase of Foreign Currency), Background note by the Secretariat, 25 September 1981, BOP/W/51 at ¶14. 
43
 GATT Analytical Index on Article XV at 429. 
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It must be kept in mind, however, that all these statements were made at a time when 
e cha  e rates  ere  ase      ar  a ues a   there  re t  a  ar e e te t “u  er the 
c  tr  ”  s  t  s ea      the  M   As      as e cha  e rates  ere  e t sta  e  the   i    t 
easily cause disturbances in trade flows and were therefore of limited concern to GATT 
contracting parties. It was only once the par value system was abolished in 1977 and 
exchange rates were allowed to float freely that the problem became significant under the 
GATT, for no changes were made to the agreement in order to adjust to the new system of 
continuously fluctuating exchange rates.
44
 
In 1975 the GATT Council established the Consultative Group of Eighteen in order to 
“ aci itate the carr i    ut     the C  tracti   Parties     their responsibilities, particularly 
 ith res ect t  … the c - r i ati   …  et ee  the GATT a   the  M ” 45 In its final 
re  rt  the C  su tati e Gr u  a   u ce  that the “  st e  ecti e c  tri uti   the GATT 
could make to the resolution of trade and financial problems would be the energetic pursuit 
of its normal activities – the identification of trade problems, efforts to define solutions and 
he   i  i   e e ti   the ” 46 
In 1984 the contracting parties GATT addressed the problem in a statement in which they 
ac     e  e  that “i  certai  circu sta ces e cha  e ar et i sta i it  c  tri utes t  
 ar et u certai t … a   a   ea  t   ressures   r i crease   r tecti  ” 47 The 
c  tracti    arties ur e  the  M  t  ta e i t  acc u t their c  cer  a   “re ie  the 
operati      the i ter ati  a    etar  s ste   ith a  ie  t    ssi  e i  r  e e ts” 48  
Despite the recognized need, no formal action was ever taken in order to clarify the 
relationship and division of jurisdiction between the GATT system and the IMF. 
                                                 
44
 Muller, Carolina, Ramos, Daniel and Thorstensen, Vera: ‘The “Missi   Li  ”  et ee  the WTO a   the 
IMF’, Journal of International Economic Law 16(2) at 371-372. 
45
 History of the Consultative Group of Eighteen, Note by the Secretariat MTN.GNG/NG14/W/5, (available 
at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92020138.pdf) at 1. 
46
 Consultative Group of Eighteen, Report to the Council of Representatives, L/5572 (1983) at 3. 
47
 Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Their Effect on Trade, Fortieth Session of the Contracting Parties, Action 
taken on 30 November 1984, L/5761 at ¶1. 
48
Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Their Effect on Trade, Fortieth Session of the Contracting Parties, Action 
taken on 30 November 1984, L/5761 at ¶3. 
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4.3 WTO and IMF Cooperation 
The question regarding cooperation between trade and monetary issues was addressed 
again in 1987 during the Uruguay Round, which led to the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization. The Ministerial Declaration determined as one of the aims of 
 e  tiati  s the  e e    e t    u  ersta  i  s a   arra  e e ts i ter a ia “t  i crease 
the contribution of the GATT to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-
making through strengthening its relationship with other international organizations for 
   etar  a    i a cia  atters” 49 The Functioning of the GATT System (FOGS) 
negotiating group was established in order to implement this specific part of the mandate.
50
 
The result of these negotiations was no formal agreement on the linkages and cooperation 
between these institutions, but a rather vague resolution included in the Marrakesh 
Declaration.
51
 Artic e        the Dec arati      the  u cti  s    the WTO states “ ith a 
view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall 
cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the International 
Ba     r Rec  structi   a   De e    e t a   its a  i iate  a e cies” 52 
The Marrakesh Declaration was followed by the so-called Coherence Declaration (The 
Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater 
Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking), in which it was stated that the WTO should 
“ ursue a    e e    c   erati    ith the i ter ati  a   r a izati  s res   si  e  or 
   etar  a    i a cia  atters”  This is to be done while respecting the mandate and the 
necessary autonomy in decision-making procedures of each institution, and more 
importantly, while avoiding the imposition of cross-conditionality or additional conditions 
on member states. The declaration also mandated the Director-Ge era     the WTO “t  
review with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President 
                                                 
49
 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 20 September 1986, MIN(86)/W/19. 
50
 Coppens, Dominic and Wouters, Jan: ‘International Economic Policy-making: Exploring the Legal 
Linkages Between the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods Institutions’, International 
Organizations Law Review 3, (2006)at 272-273. 
51
 Coppens, Dominic and Wouters, Jan: ‘International Economic Policy-making: Exploring the Legal 
Linkages Between the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods Institutions’, International 
Organizations Law Review 3, (2006) at 273. 
52
 Final Act of the Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(Marrakesh Declaration), 15 April 1994, Article III.5. 
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of the World Bank, the implications of the WTO's responsibilities for its cooperation with 
the Brett   W   s i stituti  s  as  e   as the   r s such c   erati   i ht ta e” 53 
In November 1996 the General Council of the WTO adopted a decision which provided for 
the mutual granting of observer status, consultation between the secretariats and the staff of 
the institutions, exchange of information and access to databases as well as administrative 
cooperation.
54
 
All in all, however, the relationship between the WTO and IMF remains based on the 
articles of the GATT and the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, just as it was during the 
GATT era. This is reaffirmed by the Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade 
Organization with the International Monetary Fund, which is included in the final act of 
the Uruguay Round. In this short, one- a e   cu e t  c  tracti    arties “rea  ir  that  
unless otherwise provided for in the Final Act, the relationship of the WTO with the 
International Monetary Fund, with regard to the areas covered by the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, will be based on the provisions that 
have governed the relationship of the contracting to the GATT 1947 with the International 
M  etar   u   ”55 
Although the GATT includes numerous other references to the IMF,
56
 for the purpose of 
this study, the paper will concentrate on single most important provision, GATT Article 
XV, which governs exchange arrangements. 
  
                                                 
53
 WTO Agreements with the Fund and the Bank, Annex I: Agreement between the International Monetary 
Fund and The World Trade Organization, (1996), WT/L/194. 
54
 Agreements between the WTO and the IMF and the World Bank, 18 November, 1996, WT/L/1996. 
55
 Final Act of the Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(Marrakesh Declaration), 15 April 1994, Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organization 
with the International Monetary Fund, at 393. 
56
 E.g. Article II(6), Article VII(4) and Article XIV. 
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5 Challenging Currency Undervaluation under the WTO 
5.1 General 
Before addressing the substantive provisions of the WTO agreements, it is first necessary 
to establish what kind of action from the state is required in order for currency 
undervaluation to be even addressable under the WTO dispute settlement system. Article 
3 3    the Dis ute Sett e e t U  ersta  i    r  i es that      “ easures ta en by 
a  ther e  er” ca   e res   e  i   is ute sett e e t 57 Naturally this excludes from the 
jurisdiction of the WTO any fluctuations in exchange rates that are caused by purely 
economic reasons, without any intervention from the state or any other entity.
58
 However, 
even in cases where undervaluation is caused or maintained by interventions by the central 
 a    it ca   t  e aut  atica    i  erre  that these i ter e ti  s c  stitute “ easures 
ta e     a  ther e  er”  
Article 3.3 of the DSU was interpreted in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, in 
 hich the A  e  ate B      u   that the  hrasi   “ easures ta e     a  ther e  er” 
 ust  e i ter rete   r a     The A  e  ate B    state  that “i   ri ci  e  a   act  r 
omission attributable to a WTO member can be a measure of that member for purposes of 
 is ute sett e e t  r cee i  s”  a   such acts are usua    “the acts  r   issi  s    the 
 r a s    the state  i c u i   the e ecuti e  ra ch” 59 Although in this case the Appellate 
Body did not find it necessary to consider to the extent which acts of private entities could 
be attributed to members,
60
 the issue had been discussed at length by the panel previously 
in the case Japan – Film  The  a e  reca  e  that a th u h the ter  “ easure” i  the WTO 
agreements refers to policies and actions of governments, and not those of private parties, 
GATT panels have been faced with making difficult judgments in cases where actions that 
appear to be private actions “may nonetheless be attributable to a government because of 
                                                 
57
 Artic e 3 3 rea s: “The  r   t sett e e t    situati  s i   hich a Me  er c  si ers that a    enefits 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by 
another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance 
between the rights and obligations    Me  ers ” 
58
 Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011) at 441. 
59
 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review at ¶81. 
60
 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review at ¶81, also footnote 78. 
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s  e    er  e ta  c   ecti   t   r e   rse e t    th se acti  s” 61 The panel drew the 
c  c usi   that “the  act that a  acti   is ta e      ri ate  arties   es   t ru e  ut the 
possibility that it may be deemed to be governmental if there is sufficient government 
i     e e t  ith it” a   that whether private actions can be attributable to the government 
must be established on a case-by-case basis.
62
 In case Japan - Film, the panel reached the 
conclusion that the measures in question were in fact attributable to the government, basing 
its decision partly    the ar u e t that a “ i  i   t  the c  trar    u   create a ris  that 
WTO obligations could be evaded through a Member's delegation of quasi-governmental 
auth rit  t   ri ate    ies” 63 
In many countries central banks are formally independent from organs of the state, and are 
  t u  er the  irect c  tr    r e e  i   ue ce    the state’s e ecuti e  ra ch.64 However, 
taking into consideration the rulings of the panel and the Appellate Body in the cases cited 
a   e  it is  r  a  e that i   st cases acti   ta e     the state’s ce tra   a     u    e 
 ee e  a “ easure ta e     another e  er” i  the se se    DSU Artic e 3 3 and could 
thus possibly constitute a violation of a WTO provision. As Zimmermann also points out, 
in the absence of an explicit WTO ruling on this precise question, it appears safe to say that 
formal central bank independence is insufficient for considering measures taken by central 
banks as something other than as "measures taken by another Member".
65
 
Nevertheless, the wide array of specific actions states (or their central banks) can take in 
order to achieve and maintain an undervalued currency, as well as the equivocality of the 
actual effects of these actions on the exchange rate, can make proving a breach of a WTO 
provision a rather burdensome ordeal for the complaining party. In order to even have 
currency undervaluation analyzed in the light of substantive WTO provisions, the 
complainant would first have to successfully prove that the undervalued exchange rate is in 
fact maintained by actions taken by the member state. This would mean proving first that 
there is an appreciable u  er a uati      the state’s curre c   a   sec     that this 
undervaluation is the cause of specific, identifiable measures that are attributable to the 
                                                 
61
 Panel Report, Japan – Film at ¶10.52. 
62
 Panel Report, Japan – Film at ¶10.56. 
63
 Panel Report, Japan – Film at ¶10.328. 
64
 Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011) at 442. 
65
 Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011) at 442. 
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state in question.
66
 Only once these two elements have been established can the 
adjudicating body move on to assessing whether these measures are consistent with WTO 
obligations. 
A th u h a  u  er a ue  curre c ’s effects on trade are complex, and therefore the extent 
of WTO obligations possibly breached by maintaining one wide-ranging, the most obvious 
one, and therefore the first one to consider, is GATT Article XV, titled Exchange 
Arrangements. Article XV of the GATT governs exchange arrangements and functions 
therefore as a link between the WTO and the IMF. As such it has also been proposed as 
providing an answer to the issue of trade distortions caused by undervalued currencies. 
Article XV provides both a substantial and procedural link between the WTO and the 
IMF.
67
 The substantial link is established by paragraphs 4 and 9, which are both examined 
in detail below. The procedural link is determined in paragraph 2, 3, and 5, of which 
paragraph 2 is the most relevant to this study.
68
 
5.2 GATT Article XV(4) 
5.2.1 Interpreting GATT Article XV(4) 
Paragraph 1 of Article XV states that the contracting parties shall seek cooperation with the 
IMF so as to pursue a coordinated policy with regard to exchange questions within the 
jurisdiction of the IMF and trade questions within the jurisdiction of contracting parties to 
the WTO. Paragraph 4 of the article goes on to give concrete meaning to this division of 
juris icti      stati   that c  tracti    arties “sha     t     e cha  e acti    frustrate the 
intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions 
   the Artic es    A ree e t    the   ter ati  a  M  etar   u  ”   t is this  r  isi   that 
has been invoked by academics and state representatives alike as the solution to the 
evaluation of currency undervaluation under WTO law. In practice, the paragraph prohibits 
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 Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011) at 442. 
67
 Coppens, Dominic and Wouters, Jan: ‘International Economic Policy-making: Exploring the Legal 
Linkages Between the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods Institutions’, International 
Organizations Law Review 3, (2006) at 269-270. 
68
 The remaining paragraphs 6-8 are not relevant for this study. Paragraph 6 states that contracting parties not 
yet members of the IMF shall either become members or enter into special arrangements with the contracting 
parties. Paragraph 7 determines the details of such an arrangement and paragraph 8 establishes the obligation 
of a contracting party not a member of the IMF to provide information to other contracting parties. 
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contracting parties from circumventing their obligations under the WTO by adopting 
exchange actions that distort or restrict trade. 
At first thought it seems that currency undervaluation could easily be curbed by the 
application of this provision; all that would need to be proven by the complainant is that 1) 
a contracting party has adopted an exchange action and 2) that exchange action frustrates 
the intent of the GATT. In reality however, the application of this article is far from 
simple, for numerous reasons. 
 irst    a    the ter s “e cha  e acti  ” a   “ rustrate” ha e   t  ee   e i e  i  the artic e 
or anywhere else in the GATT. Secondly, Article XV(4) has never been interpreted by a 
WTO dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body,
69
 despite the fact that it has been 
evoked by parties to disputes.
70
 The provision represents a junction point in the jurisdiction 
of the WTO and the IMF, which no party is willing to rule upon for fear of upsetting the 
status quo that has been in place from the establishment of the Bretton Woods System and 
the GATT. To further complicate the interpretation, paragraph 9 of the article provides an 
exception which may (or may not) be evocable in situations that constitute a breach of 
Article XV(4). 
The general rule for interpreting the text of WTO agreements is provided in Article 3.2 of 
WTO’s U  ersta  i      Ru es a   Pr ce ures G  er i   the Sett e e t    Disputes 
 “Dis ute Sett e e t U  ersta  i  ”  r “DSU”   Acc r i   t  Artic e 3    the  is ute 
sett e e t s ste  ser es t  “c ari   the e isti    r  isi  s    th se a ree e ts i  
acc r a ce  ith cust  ar  ru es    i ter retati       u  ic i ter ati  a   a ”  It has been 
established in WTO case law that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
   Treaties  “Vie  a C   e ti  ”71) set out such customary rules of interpretation.72 In 
acc r a ce  ith Artic e 31   hich c  i ies the “ e era  ru e    i ter retati  ”    r s    a 
treaty provision are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in light of the 
                                                 
69
 Pettis, Elizabeth L.: ‘ s Chi a’s Ma i u ati      its Curre c  a  Acti  a  e Vi  ati      the  M  a    r 
the WTO Agreements?’ 10 Journal of International Business & Law 281 (2011) at 288, and Miranda, Jorge: 
‘Currency Undervaluation as a Violation of GATT Article XV(4)’, in The U.S.-Sino Currency Dispute: New 
Insights from Economics, Politics and Law (Simon Everett, ed.) 2010, at 117. 
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 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 
WT/DS302/R, 26 November 2004, GATT Panel Report, Greece – Special Import Taxes, adopted on 8 
November 1952, G/25 - 1S/48. 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
72
 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17, Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II at 
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treat ’s   ject a    ur  se 73 If the application of this article either leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, recourse may 
 e ha  t  “su   e e tar  ea s    i ter retati  ”  i e   re arat r    r  a   the 
circu sta ces    the  r  isi  ’s c  c usi   74 The next sections aim to clarify the meaning 
of the paragraphs of Article XV in light of these rules of interpretation. 
5.2.2 Exchange Action 
In order to determine whether Article XV(4) could be applied in situations of currency 
u  er a uati    atte ti   ust  irst  e   ace     the ter  “e cha  e acti  ”:  hat   es the 
ter  “e cha  e acti  ” ea , and does that definition encompass currency manipulation? 
In WTO case law panels and the Appellate Body have regularly turned to the dictionary 
definition of a term in order to determine its ordinary meaning.
75
 According to the Oxford 
Dicti  ar   “e cha  e” ea s “the cha  i        e  t  its equi a e t i  the curre c     
a  ther c u tr ”  r “a s ste   r ar et i   hich c   ercia  tra sacti  s i     i   
curre c   shares  etc  ca   e carrie   ut  ithi   r  et ee  c u tries” 76 “Acti  ” is  i e  
the definitio  “the  act  r  r cess      i   s  ethi    t  ica    t  achie e a  ai ”  r “a 
thi      e; a  act” 77 These  icti  ar   e i iti  s su  est that “e cha  e acti  ” covers 
acts related to the changing of money or a system in which commercial transactions 
involving currency can be carried out between countries. Currency manipulation involves 
policies (i.e. actions) that have the aim of affecting the exchange rate. Therefore, a plain 
language reading of Article XV(4) would support the interpretation that it covers currency 
undervaluation.  
However, further examination of the term is necessary because interpretation cannot be 
based solely on the definition given in a dictionary. As was pointed out by the Appellate 
Body in the case US – Gasoline  “ icti  aries  a   e, are not capable of resolving complex 
questions of interpretation, as they typically aim to catalogue all meanings of words – be 
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th se ea i  s c       r rare  u i ersa   r s ecia ize ” 78 Therefore, in accordance with 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, we must to turn to examine the context of the term 
“e cha  e acti  ”  
According to some scholars, the context of the provision suggests that the term was meant 
to be given a broad meaning.
79
 This conclusion can be reached by examining terms related 
to excha  e use  i  the GATT  Artic e XV    re ers t  “  rei   e cha  e arra  e e ts” 
a   “e cha  e atters”   hereas XV 9  re ers t  “e cha  e c  tr  s  r e cha  e 
restricti  s”  A  iti  a     A  N te t  Artic es V    1  e ti  s “ u ti  e rates    
e cha  e”  “ u ti  e curre c   ractices” a   “ u ti  e curre c  e cha  e  ees” a   A  
N te t  Artic e XV  Secti   B a s  e ti  s “ u ti  e rates    e cha  e”  The use    
these terms shows that the drafters of the GATT were familiar with exchange related terms 
and, had they wished to limit the applicability of Article XV(4), they could have used a 
  re s eci ic ter  i stea     the  e era    e “e cha  e acti  ” 80 
Other scholars, however, have argued that Article XV(4) must be read in conjunction with 
the IMF Articles of Agreement,
 i   hich case the ter  “e cha  e acti  ”   u   i c u e 
“e cha  e    icies” a   “e cha  e easures”  ut   t “e cha  e rate    icies” 81 
Acc r i   t  De ters a   K   s  “e cha  e easures” a   “e cha  e    icies” re er t  
“c   erti i it ”   hich ea s the e cha  e      e c u tr ’s curre c  i t  a  ther 
currency. The IMF Articles of Agreement impose the obligation not to restrict the 
convertibility of currencies used for current transactions, that is, payments for goods or 
ser ices  “E cha  e rate    icies”  r “e cha  e rate easures”    the  ther ha   c  cer  
the value of a currency: how many units of the local currency are equal to one unit of a 
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foreign currency, or the other way around. The IMF Articles of Agreement do not obligate 
member states to set the value of their currency at a certain level and states are allowed to 
freely determine the exchange rate policy it wants to apply.
82
 
C  si eri   that Artic e XV    er s e cha  e arra  e e ts   hich are u  er the  M ’s 
jurisdiction, it makes sense to give the terms of GATT Article XV meanings consistent 
with those of the terms in the IMF Articles of Agreement. A consistent interpretation of 
terms used in both agreements is useful keeping in mind the cooperation obligations 
between the two organizations that are established in GATT Article XV(1) and XV(2), 
which is why this approach can be considered commendable. 
However, this approach to interpretation has also been criticized, because it is based on 
documents outside the WTO agreements.
83
 Indeed, an interpretation of a GATT provision 
based on the use of a term in IMF documents could be seen as inconsistent with the 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law because it takes the term out of 
its context in WTO law. It must be taken into consideration, however, that both panels and 
the Appellate Body have continuously made use of interpretative elements that are not 
included in the WTO covered agreements, e.g. acts adopted by various international 
organizations as well as decisions by international courts.
84
 Considering that Article XV(4) 
explicitly makes reference to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, it would seem rather 
logical for a WTO panel or the Appellate Body to make use of IMF materials in the 
interpretation of the terms of the provision. 
The extremely narrow interpretation presented by both Denters and Koops could also be 
said to disregard the object and purpose of the Article XV(4). The purpose of the Article is 
to guarantee that member states do not circumvent their obligations under the GATT by 
adopting measures that have negative trade effects but that are under the jurisdiction of the 
IMF and not the WTO. It might seem discrepant to interpret the provision in such a narrow 
manner that it would, simply due to a technical inter retati      the ter  “e cha  e 
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acti  ”  e c u e  r   the sc  e    a   icati      Artic e XV 4  e cha  e rate acti   that 
frustrates the intent of the GATT.
85
 
Several academics have also pointed out that the preparatory work of the article provides 
evidence that exchange rate policies were intended to be included in the scope of the 
article.
86
 At the ti e    the  ra ti      the GATT  “ a i u ati  ”    the  ar  a ue    a 
currency was a well-known and commonly used method of protecting domestic markets by 
limiti   the a  u t    i   rts  Acc r i   t  Jac s    the  ra ters    the GATT “ e t 
constrained to include some protection against them in the tariff agreement, even though 
the   ter ati  a  M  etar   u   artic es c  tai e  s  e si i ar  r  isi  s” 87 Now that 
the par value system has been ended and states are freely allowed to not only choose the 
currency arrangement (pegged, freely floating, crawling peg etc.) but also determine their 
curre c ’s  a ue  the ris     states a i u ati   their curre cies is e e  higher than it was 
during the par value system. Therefore the need to be able to curb such action under the 
WTO system is even more accentuated than it was at the time GATT Article XV(4) was 
drafted and the arguments put forth by the drafters are still more than valid. 
On the other hand, Zimmermann makes a convincing argument that the circumstances 
re ar i   the  e  tiati      the artic e su   rt the i ter retati   that it is “u  i e   this 
provision could serve as an independent basis for a WTO claim against maintaining an 
u  er a ue  rea  e cha  e rate  es ecia    i  a  is ute  et ee  t   WTO e  ers … that 
are   th a s  e  ers    the  M ”  Acc r i   t  Zi  er a   Artic e XV 4   as 
introduced in order to protect GATT contracting parties in situations where other 
contracting parties were not members of the IMF and had for some reason been granted an 
exemption from making a special exchange arrangement with the Fund in accordance with 
GATT Article XV(6)
88  Artic e XV 4   as there  re ea t t  c  er “the   te tially 
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extended periods of time during which no special exchange arrangement is in place 
 et ee  the WTO a   a e  er that is   t  et  r        er a e  er    the  M ” 89 If 
this were the correct reading of the Article, it could not be invoked as a basis for a WTO 
claim by the United States against China in the currency undervaluation dispute, seeing as 
both are members of the IMF. However, as Zimmermann himself points out, the issue 
re ai s “s ecu ati e” as      as there is    WTO case  a     the artic e 90 
In conclusion, it must be said that either a narrow or a wider interpretation of the term 
“e cha  e acti  ” is   ssi  e  Whether  r   t the sc  e    Artic e XV 4  c  ers e cha  e 
rate action and therefore currency undervaluation, remains to be determined by future case 
law or a specific WTO agreement or declaration on the subject. For the sake of this paper, 
the       i   a a  sis  arts  r   the  resu   siti   that “e cha  e acti  ” i c u es 
currency undervaluation and that Article XV(4) is generally applicable to situations such as 
the case of China. 
5.2.3 Frustrating the Intent of GATT provisions 
Artic e XV 4   r  i es that c  tracti    arties “sha     t     e cha  e acti     rustrate the 
i te t    the  r  isi  s    this A ree e t”  E e  i  the  recise ea i      “e cha  e 
acti  ”  as  eter i e   this  r  isi    ea es   e  t    re questi  s:  hat is the 
“i te t”     r  isi  s    the GATT a    hat a  u ts t  the “ rustrati  ”    that i te t? 
A    te t  Artic e XV 4   r  i es that “the   r  ‘ rustrate’ is i te  e  to indicate, for 
example, that infringements of the letter of any Article of this Agreement by exchange 
action shall not be regarded as a violation of that Article if, in practice, there is no 
a  recia  e  e arture  r   the i te t    the Artic e ” This  hrase, and the two examples 
that follow it, seem to signify that in order for there to be a frustration of the intent of the 
GATT, there must be a breach of the letter of a specific article and additionally an 
“a  recia  e  e arture”  r   the i te t    that single article. However, the ad note starts 
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     ith “  r e a   e”   hich   u   see  t  i  icate that it is   ssi  e “ rustrate” the 
 r  isi  s    the GATT a s  i   ther  a s  Acc r i   t  Zi  er a    the   r s “  r 
e a   e” ser e      t  i  icate that the same interpretation must be applied analogously to 
trade action frustrating the intent of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.
91
 This is one 
possible interpretation, but it is not foreclosed that the example given in the ad note is 
indeed just an example  a   that  ther a  ers    “ rustrati   the i te t    the GATT” are 
possible. For example, it could be possible that the provision would cover a situation where 
there is    e   icit  reach    a s eci ic  r  isi     ut    ethe ess “ rustrati      the i te t” 
of a single provision or perhaps even of the GATT as a whole.  
Starting off with the first interpretation, it seems unlikely that currency undervaluation 
c u    e   u   t   reach the “ etter”    a s eci ic GATT  r  isi   i  a  iti   t  
frustrating the intent of that provision. It is much more likely that maintaining an 
undervalued currency be considered a frustration of the intent of a provision without there 
being an actual violation of the provision in the strict sense. For example Paragraph 3 of 
Artic e       tari   c  cessi  s  r  i es that “   c  tracti    art  sha   a ter its eth      
determining dutiable value or converting currencies so as to impair the value of any of the 
c  cessi  s”  Asserti   that ai tai i   a  u  er a ue  curre c  is a  i  ation of the 
letter of this article would be somewhat farfetched. However, it could easily be said to 
frustrate the intent of this article, which is that tariff concessions should not be distorted by 
measures that indirectly affect the value of the concessions agreed to. As Staiger and Sykes 
put it 
“[T]he heart of the GATT bargain has always been the market access 
commitments associated with the tariff bindings under Article II. A 
powerful argument can be made that any exchange action that frustrates 
these market access commitments would qualify as a potential violation 
u  er Artic e XV ”92 
Another important WTO rule that an undervalued currency clearly frustrates the intent of is 
the general prohibition on export subsidies, which is codified in Article 3 of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The problem in this case is that it is an open 
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question  hether the  hrasi   “ r  isi  s    this A ree e t” c  ers      the  r  isi  s 
of the GATT or can be interpreted to cover other WTO Agreements which did not exist at 
the time of the drafting of the GATT. The general prohibition on export subsidies is not 
found in the text of the GATT itself but in a subsequent agreement, and therefore it is 
u c ear  hether “ rustrati   the i te t”    the re e a t SCMA provision could be 
interpreted as a breach of GATT Article XV(4).  
H  e er  e e  i  the i ter retati      the  hrasi   “ r  isi  s    this A ree e t” i  
GATT Article XV(4) was limited to the provisions only of the GATT itself, it could easily 
be argued that intent of the original provision on subsidies, GATT Article XVI, is 
frustrated by an undervalued currency that functions as an export subsidy. Article XVI 
      r hi its e   rt su si ies that resu t i  the sa e    a “ r  uct   r e   rt at a  rice 
lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic 
 ar et”   t focuses on the trade effects of export subsidies, instead of banning them 
outright.
93
 If it can be proven that an undervalued currency lowers the prices of products 
for export compared to the prices of the same products in the domestic market, the intent of 
this provision is frustrated and there is potentially a violation of Article XV(4) of the 
GATT. 
The third possible interpretation brings Article XV(4) close to the non-violation complaint 
possibility given in Article XXIII, entitled Nullification or Impairment.
94
 This 
interpretation of Article XV(4) would be that it is sufficient that the intent of the GATT as 
a whole is frustrated, without there being an explicit violation of any single provision. 
Acc r i   t  the O   r  Dicti  ar   “i te t” is a  “i te ti    r  ur  se”   There  re  it 
c u    e ar ue  that the “i te t”    the GATT ca   e   u   i  its  rea   e   hich 
describes the purpose of the agreement. Based on the preamble, the purpose of the GATT 
c u    e sai  t   e “raisi   sta  ar s     i i    e suri    u   e      e t a   a  ar e a   
stea i    r  i      u e    rea  i c  e a   e  ecti e  e a  ”  r   re s eci ica     “the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
 iscri i at r  treat e t i  i ter ati  a  c   erce”  The i te t    the GATT c u   a s  
 e i ter rete  t   e a  re  e a    e  such as the sti u ati      “articu ate  ru es    
conduct for commercial transaction so that the bargained competitive conditions for 
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 e  ers’ ar ets are   t ar itrari    istur e ” 95 The Appellate Body stated in the case 
EC – Computer Equipment  that the “  ject a    ur  se    the GATT is “the securit  a   
 re icta i it     ‘the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
su sta tia  re ucti      tari  s a    ther  arriers t  tra e’” 96  
Either way, the intent of the provisions of the GATT as a whole is not only hard to 
determine but also extremely abstract. Taking into consideration that the dispute settlement 
system of the WTO may not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of the covered 
agreements,
97
 an interpretation of Article XV(4) that allows for the declaration of a 
violation based on such an abstract i ea    “i te t”   es   t see    ausi  e  r 
rec   e  a  e  As Ju   accurate     i ts  ut  “ru i   curre c  a i u ati   i  e a   ase  
on such broad interpretation and abstract consequence would face a serious legal 
challenge, especially since controlling the value of a currency falls within the sovereign 
ri ht    a state” 98 
   the e    the i ter retati      “ rustrati      the i te t    the  r  isi  s    the GATT” 
can be interpreted in two ways. Either its purpose is to widen the possibility of making an 
exchange-related claim under the WTO, by making it possible to contest an exchange 
measure under the GATT if it frustrates the intent of a GATT provision even though there 
is no explicit breach of the letter of the provision. Alternatively, it could be intended to 
narrow the possibilities of finding that an exchange measure is in violation of the GATT by 
requiring that in addition to the necessary element of an explicit violation of the letter of a 
GATT provision, there must be an appreciable departure from the intent of the provision. It 
is therefore unclear whether the article could be invoked by a WTO member as the basis 
for a claim in a dispute concerning undervalued currencies. 
5.3 GATT Article XV(9) 
Paragraph 9 further complicates the interpretation of Article XV by introducing an 
exception which declares that nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the use by a 
                                                 
95
 Ahn, Dukgeun: ‘Is the Chinese exchange-rate re i e ‘WTO- e a ’?’, The US-Sino Currency Dispute: New 
Insights from Politics, Economics and Law, (Simon J. Evenett (ed.) London (2010), at 141. 
96
 Appellate Body Report,  EC – Computer Equipment at ¶82. 
97
 Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 3.2 in fine. 
98
 Jung, Hanuel: ‘Tackling Currency Manipulation with International Law: Why and How Currency 
Manipulation should be Adjudicated?’, Vol. 9 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, Issue 2 
(2012) at 198. 
30 
 
contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in accordance with the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
99 
This provision establishes that 
as      as e cha  e c  tr  s  r e cha  e restricti  s are c  siste t  ith the e  er’s 
obligations under the IMF, there can be no violation of the GATT. What is unclear, 
however, is whether this exception applies also to Article XV(4); that is, whether XV(4) is 
lex specialis and therefore prevails over the exception in XV(9) or vice versa.
100 
Academics have presented that XV(9) is more specific and therefore takes precedence over 
XV(4). Siegel and Zimmermann both argue that XV(9) is more specific because it refers to 
“e cha  e c  tr  s  r e cha  e restricti  s i  acc r a ce  ith the Artic es    A ree e t 
   the   ter ati  a  M  etar   u  ”   hereas XV 4  re ers t  the uch  re  e era  ter  
“e cha  e acti  ” 101 Moreover, Siegel argues that the negotiating history of the GATT 
a s  su   rts this i ter retati     ecause the qua i  i     r s “su ject t  the  r  isi  s    
 ara ra h 4    this Artic e”   hich  ere i c u e  i  the  irst  ra t    the GATT  ere 
deliberately deleted from the final text of this article.
102
 It would appear, therefore, that 
Article XV(9) provides an exception to the general rule set out in Article XV(4) that 
exchange actions that frustrates obligations and commitments under the GATT are 
prohibited.
103
 
Whether or not the exception provided for in Article XV(9) could be invoked to justify the 
maintaining of an undervalued currency remains yet to be determined, since no formal 
interpretation of the relationship between the paragraphs of the article has been made. 
According to Jackson, a special sub-group to the Ninth Session of the GATT Contracting 
Parties discussed the relationship between the two paragraphs, but instead of giving an 
i ter retati      it   eci e  t   ea e it t  “e  irica  c  si erati   i  a    he  the 
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particu ar   i ts ar se  hich ha  a  eari      it” 104 In the case Dominican Republic – 
Cigarettes, China requested the panel to clarify the relationship between paragraphs XV(4) 
and XV(9)105, but unfortunately the panel found it unnecessary to address the issue.
106
 
If the exception embodied in Article XV(9) were determined to be applicable to situations 
which fell under GATT Article XV(4), the next step would be to determine what the 
 hrase “e cha  e c  tr  s  r e cha  e restricti  s i  acc r a ce  ith the Artic es of 
A ree e t    the   ter ati  a   u  ” actua    e c   asses  Si ce      “e cha  e 
c  tr  s” a   “e cha  e restricti  s” are c  ere     the e ce ti    it must be concluded 
that exchange actions other than these could constitute a violation of GATT XV(4), even if 
they were in accordance with the IMF Articles of Agreement.
107
 
Ah  has ar ue  that “e cha  e c  tr  s  r e cha  e restricti  s”      t i c u e e cha  e 
policies. According to Ahn, Article XV(9) refers to exchange controls or restrictions on 
converti i it  that ha e  ee  “ er itte     s eci ic  ecisi  s a e    the  M  as s ecia  
 easures t  a  ress  a a ce     a  e t  r   e s    its e  ers” a   that “a  ra   sca e 
exchange-rate    ic ” a   te     a state i   r er t   i  the  a ue    its curre c    uld not 
be covered by this exception.
108
 
On the other hand, Zimmermann attests that the measures customarily taken by a state in 
order to maintain an undervalued currency, that is, capital controls, surrender requirements, 
the channeling of payments through the banking system and increased reserve requirement, 
could well amount to exchange restrictions or exchange controls in the sense of Article 
XV(9).
109
 A more in-depth interpretation Article XV(9) requires an examination of the 
IMF Articles of Agreement, specifically Articles VI and VIII thereof, which ultimately 
deal with exchange controls and exchange restrictions. 
Article VI, titled Controls of Capital Transfers, provides that member states are generally 
a    e  t  “e ercise such c  tr  s as are  ecessar  to regulate international capital 
                                                 
104
 Jackson, John: World Trade and the Law of the GATT, United States of America (1969) at 485-486. 
105
Panel Dominican Republic – Cigarettes at ¶5.58. 
106
 Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011) at 472, footnote 231. 
107
 Muller, Carolina, Ramos, Daniel and Thorstensen, Vera: ‘The “Missi   Li  ”  et ee  the WTO a   the 
IMF’, Journal of International Economic Law 16(2) at 377. 
108
 Ahn, Dukgeun: ‘Is the Chinese exchange-rate re i e ‘WTO- e a ’?’, in The US-Sino Currency Dispute: 
New Insights from Politics, Economics and Law, (Simon J. Evenett (ed.)) London (2010) at 141. 
109
 Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011) at 464. 
32 
 
   e e ts”  e ce t  he  the  are e ercise  “i  a a  er  hich  i   restrict  a  e ts   r 
curre t tra sacti  s” u  ess the  M  has  i e  its a  r  a  110 Therefore, if the measures 
implemented by a state in order to achieve or maintain an undervalued currency include 
restrictions on payments for current transactions, these measures require explicit consent 
from the IMF, or else they are inconsistent with the Articles of Agreement and accordingly 
not justified under GATT Article XV(9). 
As   r e cha  e restricti  s  the re e a t  M  Artic e V   :  a   r  i es that “   e  er 
shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and 
tra s ers   r curre t i ter ati  a  tra sacti  s”     the case D  inican Republic – 
Cigarettes, the panel referred to a 1960 IMF Executive Board Decision on Articles VIII 
and XIV, in which the meaning of this provision is clarified, and stated that this definition 
should be respected when interpreting GATT Article XV(9).
111
 The decision declares that 
the “ ui i    ri ci  e” i  ascertai i    hether a easure is a restricti   i  the se se    
Artic e V   :  a  “is  hether it i     es a  irect    er  e ta   i itati      the a ai a i it  
 r use    e cha  e as such” 112 Determining whether a measure amounts to an exchange 
restriction is therefore based on a purely technical criterion and the reason why the 
restrictions have been implemented (e.g. maintaining a currency at a certain value or other 
exchange policy-related purposes) is completely irrelevant.
113
 Consequently, exchange 
restrictions implemented in order to maintain an undervalued currency are inconsistent 
with the IMF Articles of Agreement and would not be included in the scope of GATT 
Article XV(9), unless they have been expressly authorized by the IMF.
114
 Interpreting 
Article XV(9) in this way allows for the legal discussion to be shifted from the politically 
extremely sensitive (and essentially inoperative) IMF Article IV(1)iii to the more technical 
issues behind currency manipulation.
115
 
                                                 
110
 IMF Articles of Agreement, Article VI Section 3. 
111
 Panel Dominican Republic – Cigarettes at ¶7.132. 
112
 IMF Executive Board Decision No. 1034-(60/27), June 1, 1960, in Selected Decisions and Selected 
Documents of the International Monetary Fund, Thirty-sixth Issue, Washington DC (2011). 
113
 Siegel, Deborah: ‘Le a  As ects    the  M  WTO Re ati  shi : The  u  ’s Artic es    A ree e t a   
the WTO Agreements’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 3 (2002) at 601; Zimmermann, 
Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of International Law 
(2011) at 464. 
114
 Zimmermann, Claus D.: ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law’, 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011) at 464. 
115
 Muller, Carolina, Ramos, Daniel and Thorstensen, Vera: ‘The “Missi   Li  ”  et ee  the WTO a   the 
IMF’, Journal of International Economic Law 16(2) at 377. 
33 
 
The final difficulty in applying Article XV(9) is that it requires an assessment of the 
measures in question not only in the light of the GATT, but also under the IMF Articles of 
Agreement, which requires consultations with the IMF. 
5.4 Procedural Link: Consultations with the IMF Under Article XV(2) 
5.4.1 Does the Obligation Extend to Dispute Settlement Proceedings? 
Article XV(2) provides that contracting parties shall consult fully with the International 
Monetary Fund in matters concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign 
e cha  e restricti  s a   i  such c  su tati  s “acce t a    i  i  s    statistica  a    ther 
facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances 
of payments, and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action by a 
contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of 
the   ter ati  a  M  etar   u  ”   
The provision not only obligates the WTO to consult with the IMF, but also to accept 
certain determinations provided by the Fund. These determinations can be divided into 
factual (often statistical) findings concerning for example monetary reserves and balance 
of payments, and legal findings, which concern the legality of measures with the  u  s’ 
Articles of Agreement.
116
 Whereas factual findings serve to provide the panel the 
information it needs in order to apply certain provisions, for example the balance of 
payments exception established in Article XII of the GATT, legal findings serve to avoid 
cross-conditionality between WTO and IMF obligations. 
Although Article XV(2) seems to establish a clear obligation, it is somewhat ambiguous to 
whom this obligation extends. In particular, what remains to be determined is whether the 
obligation covers dispute settlement proceedings. The issue was debated at length by USA 
and India before the panel in the case India – Quantitative Restrictions. Although in this 
case the questi   re ar e     ia’s  a a ce     a  e ts  the ar u e ts c  cer i   the r le 
of the IMF and its findings in the dispute settlement procedure are equally applicable to a 
case concerning exchange arrangements.  
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The United States argued that in accordance with the incorporation clause of the GATT in 
the WTO A ree e t  the ter  “c  tracti    arties” re ers t  the WTO  a   the WTO 
includes panels. The United States concluded that the panel should consult the IMF if it 
“ha  a     u ts”  The U ite  States  rese te  the c   i ci   ar u e t that i  the 
obligation of Article XV(2) did not extend to panels, they would be less constrained by 
GATT rules than other WTO bodies, which could lead to inconsistency between panels 
and the rest of the WTO.
117
 India, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the 
interpretation of GATT XV(2) presented by the United States ignores the division of 
functions between the various bodies of the WTO. India presented the opposite view, 
claiming that the obligations established in the provision do not extend to panels.
118
  
Instead of taking the opportunity to resolve this issue, the panel chose to avoid taking a 
stance by stating that it did not find it necessary to determine whether Article XV(2) 
requires panels to consult with the IMF. The panel opted, instead, to consult the IMF under 
Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding   hich  r  i es that each  a e  “ a  
seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion 
   certai  as ects    the atter"  The  a e  state  that “ hate er the i ter retati      
Article XV:2 of GATT 1994, Article 13.1 of the DSU entitles the Panel to consult with the 
IMF in order to obtain any relevant information relating to India's monetary reserves and 
balance-of- a  e ts situati    hich   u   assist … i  assessi   the c ai s su  itte ” 119 
Since this  i  i      the  a e ’s  ecisi    as   t a  ea e   the A  e  ate B      u   it 
unnecessary to address it in its report.
120
 
A more recent case, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, placed the panel 
in the situation to interpret the article yet again, this time specifically in order to determine 
whether the exception provided in GATT XV(9) was applicable to the measures at hand in 
the dispute.
121
 Given a second chance, the panel did not take the easy way out, but 
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consulted the IMF on the basis Article XV(2) for the first (and so far only) time in the 
history of the WTO.
122
 
The panel considered it necessary to consult with the IMF based on Article XV(2), because 
the Dominican Republic argued that its imposition of the import charges and fees was an 
exchange restriction that was in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, 
and therefore justified under Article XV(9)
123
. The panel therefore requested the IMF to 
provide information on whether the measure taken by the Dominican Republic was an 
"exchange control" or "exchange restriction" under the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF.
124
    its re     the  M  state  that the easure  i    t “c  stitute a u ti  e curre c  
 ractice  r a  e cha  e restricti  ” a    as “       er su ject t   u   a  r  a ” 125 
Taking this into consideration, the panel concluded that the measure did not constitute an 
“e cha  e restricti  ”  ithi  the ea i      Artic e XV 9  a   was therefore not 
justified.
126
 
Although the panel decided to consult the IMF and accept its findings in accordance with 
GATT Article XV(2), the report did not shed light on the correct interpretation of this 
provision, i.e. whether the panel was under the obligation to do so. The panel consulted the 
 M   ecause it “ ee e  t  see   re i   r ati  ” a     r this reas   “ ee e  t  c  su t 
 ith the  M   ase      ara ra h      Artic e XV”  The  a  ua e    the  a e ’s re  rt 
leaves open the question of whether the panel would have been under the obligation to 
consult the IMF had it considered that it did not need further information.
127
 As 
Zi  er a     i ts  ut  “it a  ears t  ha e reas  e  e act   as i  it  ere  r cee i      
the  asis    its  iscreti  ar  auth rit  u  er DSU Artic e 13” 128 In fact, the reasoning of 
the panel in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, rather contradictorily, actually seems to 
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support the interpretation that Article XV(2) does not obligate the panel to consult with the 
 M    ut  ea es the atter t  the  a e ’s  iscreti    Such a  i ter retati    h  e er  
would seem to be contrary to the or i ar  ea i      the   r s    the  r  isi  : “sha   
c  su t” a   “sha   acce t”  Si ce the  a e  c  su te  the  M  u  er Artic e XV     a   
not under DSU Article 13, it is implied that the panel deemed itself to be covered by the 
ter  “c  tracti    arties”   hich re ers t  the WTO 129 If this is the case, the panel would 
have been obligated under Article XV(2) to consult the IMF and accept its findings, and 
such a  ecisi   c u     t ha e  ee  si     the resu t    the  a e s’  iscreti     t   u   
seem, therefore, that the only logical interpretation of the report of the panel is to conclude 
that, despite the fact that the panel did not explicitly so articulate when wording its 
decision, Article XV(2) does obligate panels, and therefore also the Appellate Body, to 
consult the IMF and accept its findings in the matters listed in the provision. 
An issue that has been brought up by commentators in relation to this particular aspect of 
Article XV(2) is the apparent conflict between the obligation of the panel to accept as 
dispositive the determination of the IMF and, on the other hand, Article 11 of the DSU, 
which requires the panel to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including 
an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements. Siegel argues that these obligations can be 
reconciled by assessing them in light of DSU Article 3.2, which provides that rulings of 
panels may not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
a ree e ts     the   r s    Sie e   “[E] c u i   the  a e   r   the c  su tati   
requirement would change the substantive effect of the instruction in the GATT precisely 
in the circumstances where these substantive rules are being applied to determine 
c    ia ce  ith the a ree e ts” 130 
This question was discussed at length before the Appellate Body in India – Quantitative 
Restrictions, in which India claimed that the panel had acted inconsistently with the 
obligation of Article 11 of the DSU    “ e e ati   t  the  M  its  ut  t  a e a  
  jecti e assess e t    the atter” 131 The Appellate Body found that the claim that the 
 a e  ha  “ e e ate  its ju icia   u cti   t  a e a    jecti e assess e t    the atter” t  
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the Fund was not supported by anything in the panel report. According to the Appellate 
B     the  a e  ha    t si     acce te  the  M ’s  ie s  ut rather ha  “critica    
assesse ” the  a   “a s  c  si ere   ther  ata a     i i  s i  reachi   its 
c  c usi  s” 132 and therefore had not acted inconsistently with DSU Article 11.133 
Another extremely valid point presented by Siegel is that the inclusion of the DSU in the 
WTO A ree e ts “sh u     t  e i ter rete  i  a  a  that cha  es the re ati  shi  
 et ee  the  u   a   the WTO” 134 If the obligation provided in Article XV(2) were to be 
interpreted not to extend to panels, it would mean that the institutional relationship 
between the IMF and the WTO, as it was established in the GATT 1947, would have been 
changed by the establishment of the dispute settlement system of the WTO. As Siegel 
points out, it would be rather inadvisable to leave such an important and far-reaching 
decision to be made by the interpretation of a panel.
135
 
5.4.2 Legal Findings 
Whether or not the obligation of Article XV(2) applies to panels as well as to other WTO 
bodies, the next step is to determine what sort of statement is required from the IMF in 
order for the panel to be able to conclude that a measure is inconsistent (or in accordance) 
with the IMF Articles of Agreement. Is it necessary for the Fund to state outright that there 
is a violation of its Articles of Agreement, or does it suffice that the Fund states indirectly 
that a easure is  erha s   t c    ete   c  siste t  ith the e  er’s    i ati  s u  er 
the IMF. Must the statement be an official one made by the Executive Board of the Fund or 
is for example a statement drafted by the staff sufficient? What if the reply of the IMF is 
ambiguous and does not explicitly state whether or not the measure is in accordance with 
the Articles of Agreement? These questions could be of pivotal importance when 
considering the reason why a case of currency undervaluation would be brought before the 
WTO instead of the IMF in the first place; namely the difficulties in applying Article 
IV(1)iii of the IMF Articles of Agreement.
136
 If, in order to apply Article XV(4), the panel 
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would first have to determine that the exception provided in Article XV(9) did not apply, 
a   this require  a   r a  state e t  r   the  M ’s E ecuti e B ar  that Article IV(1)iii 
was breached, the essential inoperativeness of the Article would be introduced into the 
WTO system and the parties would be brought back to square one.  
Fortunately, as was discussed above,
137
 it is not inevitably necessary for a breach of Article 
IV(1)iii to be found in order for Article XV(9) not to apply. Although based on the titles of 
the two articles, there is a clear link between Article XV of the GATT (Exchange 
Arrangements) and Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement (Obligations Regarding 
Exchange Arrangements), a state that frustrates the intent of the GATT does not 
necessarily have to be a currency manipulator in the sense of Article IV(1)(iii).
138
 In order 
for the measure to fall outside the scope of the justification provided in Article XV(9), it 
su  ices that it is   t “i  acc r a ce  ith” the  M  Artic es    A ree e t  i e  that it 
breaches any article of the Articles of Agreement. Since the measures implemented by 
states in order to maintain an undervalued currency are manifold, they may fall under 
various provisions of the IMF Articles of Agreement, for example Articles VI and VIII, 
which regard exchange controls and exchange restrictions. Nevertheless, the nature of 
consultations with the IMF, namely what sort of reply is required and from whom, can play 
an important role in applying Article XV(9). 
Acc r i   t  Sie e   the re ere ce i  Artic e XV    t  “the   ter ati  a  M  etar   u  ” 
means formal contact on an institutional level, and in this context, refers to the Executive 
Board. A response to a request from the WTO would be drafted by the staff, but subject to 
the B ar ’s a  r  a   e  re  ei   su  itte      eha      the  u   139 The Executive 
Board is composed of 24 Directors, who are appointed or elected by member countries or 
 r u s    c u tries a   thus re rese t these c u tries’  ie s 140  
In the case Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, the panel reached the conclusion that the 
foreign exchange fee implemented by the Dominican Republic was not justified under 
GATT XV(9), even though the IMF had not in its reply determined whether the measure 
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 as i  acc r a ce  ith the  u  ’s Artic es    A ree e t 141 Since consultations with the 
IMF did not give an answer to the question, the panel turned to analyze, albeit on an 
arguendo level, whether the Dominican Republic had discharged its burden of proof in 
 e   strati   that the easure is “i  acc r a ce  ith” the  M  Artic es    A ree e t 142 
The panel concluded that the IMF news release, in which the IMF informed of its waiver 
decision, provided by the Dominican Republic as proof, did not demonstrate that the 
 easure  as “i  acc r a ce  ith” the  M  Artic es    A ree e t 143 Although the issue 
a  resse     the  a e  i  this situati    as   t      the   r  i   hich the  M ’s 
statements on the measure at question were provided to the panel, but also their substance, 
the interesting aspect of this case is that the panel apparently considered itself competent to 
examine the IMF-consistency of the measure without an explicit statement in this regard 
from the IMF itself.
144
 
The reasoning of the panel in this case seems to establish the possibility for a panel to 
rather i  e e  e t   assess  hether a easure is c  siste t  ith the  u  ’s Artic es    
Agreement, provided that such a determination is necessary for the application of GATT 
Article XV(9) and the IMF has not, for some reason or other, provided the panel with its 
own determination regarding consistency during the consultations held under GATT 
Article XV(2). 
5.4.3 Factual Findings 
The relevancy of Article XV(2) in interpreting Article XV(4) is not, however, limited to 
situations to which the exception provided in Article XV(9) is applicable and findings of a 
legal nature provided by the IMF are necessary. Even in the scenario that Article XV(4) 
was deemed lex specialis and Article XV(9) was therefore not applicable, or if the 
measures in question were interpreted not to c  stitute “e cha  e c  tr  s”  r “e cha  e 
restricti  s” a    ere there  re   t c  ere      ara ra h 9, consultation with the IMF 
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might nevertheless be necessary in order to obtain the factual findings required to make an 
appropriate assessment of the exchange measures in question. 
Article XV(2) provides that in cases in which the WTO is called upon to consider or deal 
with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange 
arrangements, it shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the 
Fund. As part of its activities, the IMF regularly collects and analyzes statistical and other 
data relevant to its surveillance and other activities. The function of consultation in these 
matters is to make use    the  M ’s s ecia  e  ertise i  acquiri   the  ata  ecessar    r the 
WTO to make a legal assessment of the matter at hand.
145
  
In a case concerning currency undervaluation, the statistical findings required by the panel 
in order to assess the matter would be for example related to what the value of the currency 
would be if it was allowed to float freely and the maintained e cha  e rate’s level of 
misalignment compared to this value, or statistical findings related to the interventions 
made by the central bank on the currency market, etc. Zimmermann lists the following as 
the most notable possibilities of actions taken in order to achieve and maintain an 
undervalued exchange rate: capital controls combined with sterilization, surrender 
requirements for export earnings, increased reserve requirements, and price controls.
146
 In 
most cases such measures and their effects would probably be deemed to fall under 
“ r   e s c  cer i     etar  reser es   a a ces     a  e ts  r   rei   e cha  e 
arra  e e ts” and thus under the consultation obligation. 
When the panel consults with the IMF concerning factual findings, it must be stressed that 
these consultations do not in any way change the obligations of the panel or the parties to 
the dispute under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. In India – Autos, the panel stated 
that “[I]t is c ear that a  a e ’s  act  i  i   a  ate sh u     t  e uti ize  s  as t  a e 
out a  ri a  acie case  here that is   t achie e     the re e a t  art  ” In the case, India 
had failed to make a prima facie case that its balance of payments situation was such as to 
justify measures under GATT Article XVIII:B. Instead, it had indicated that it expected the 
 a e  t  c  su t the  M  i   eter i i      ia’s  a a ce     a  e ts situati    The panel 
stated that at an appropriate stage in proceedings, such consultations could be helpful in 
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 eter i i    hether    ia’s easures  ere justi ie  u  er Article XVIII:B, but that the 
ar u e ts  rese te        ia “ i    t e e   ea  the  a e  t  that   i t” 147 
The  a e ’s    i ati   t  a e a    jecti e assess e t    the atter i  acc r a ce  ith 
DSU Article 11 was already discussed above. In the case of factual findings it is clear that 
c  su tati  s  ith the  M       t  ut at ris  the  a e s’   jecti e assess e t    the 
matter, but rather serve to provide the necessary statistical and other factual information in 
order to make such an assessment. Although under Article XV(2) the panel is under the 
   i ati   t  “acce t a    i  i  s”  rese te     the  M   it ust sti   a e a    jecti e 
assessment of whether, based on these findings and those provided by the parties to the 
dispute, the measures in question are consistent with WTO provisions. 
Even if the panel deemed itself not to be obligated under Article XV(2) to consult with the 
IMF, in a hypothetical case concerning currency undervaluation, it might still find it 
necessary, or simply useful, to do so under DSU Article 13 in order to fulfill its obligation 
of making an objective assessment of the matter. Under DSU Article 13, panels have the 
right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems 
appropriate.
148
 In India – Quantitative Restrictions the panel consulted the IMF based on 
this provision, stating that Article 13.1 of the DSU entitles the panel to consult with the 
 M  i   r er t    tai  a   re e a t i   r ati   re ati   t     ia’s   etar  reser es a   
balance-of-payments situation which would be of assistance in assessing the claims 
submitted by the parties.
149
 
The significant difference in whether the panel consults the IMF under its general right to 
seek information under DSU Article 13 or the specific consultation obligation provided in 
GATT Artic e XV    is the  a e ’s  iscreti    U  er DSU Artic e 13  the  a e  ca   ree   
decide whether to consult the IMF and also use its discretion in whether or not to accept 
the findings presented by the IMF. Under GATT Article XV(2), on the other hand, the 
panel has no discretion in deciding whether to consult the IMF, nor in accepting its 
findings.  
This difference was illustrated in the case Argentina – Textiles and Footwear, in which the 
obligation provided in DSU Article 11, the  a e ’s ri ht t  see  i   r ati   u  er DSU 
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Article 13 as well as the obligation provided in GATT Article XV(2) were discussed. The 
Appellate Body first concluded that the case did not involve measures that required the 
panel to consult with the IMF under GATT Article XV(2).
150
 The Appellate Body stated 
that it “ i ht  erha s ha e  ee  use u    r the  a e  t  ha e c  su te   ith the  M ”  
However, contrary to the arguments presented by Argentina, the Appellate Body reached 
the conclusion that the panel acted within the bounds of its discretionary authority under 
Articles 11 and 13 of the DSU in deciding not to seek information from, nor to consult 
with, the IMF on the matter in question.
151
 Had the Appellate Body reached a different 
conclusion regarding the applicability of GATT Article XV(2), this would not have been 
the case. 
5.5 From Overlapping Jurisdictions to a Loophole? 
Already at the time of the founding of the IMF and the GATT system, it had been realized 
that trade and monetary measures are two sides of the same coin, and thus the competences 
of the two systems could not be clearly separated, nor would it make sense to try to do so. 
Instead, the systems were established in order to complement each other, and measures 
were taken to avoid cross-conditionality between the rights and obligations under both 
systems. In order to accomplish this, both substantial and procedural links were included in 
the GATT. The most important of these are provided in Article XV entitled Exchange 
Arrangements. This solution, the interpretation of which has been examined in detail 
a   e  is  hat Viter   ca  s “re i e   rr  i  ”: the incorporation of IMF rules into trade 
treaties. The IMF regime on exchange restrictions was borrowed in its entirety into the 
GATT system, and with the Marrakesh Agreement, directly into the WTO almost five 
decades later.
152
  
The  i  icu ties this “re i e   rr  i   tech ique” brings with it are numerous, and have 
been discussed at length above. Although the procedural link provided in GATT Article 
XV(2) has been interpreted by the panel in recent cases, many other issues remain to be 
addressed by a competent authority, and are currently the object of speculation by 
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academics and politicians alike. In the face of such legal uncertainty, it seems that the 
majority have given up on Article XV and sought to address the problem of currency 
undervaluation under the WTO regime by other means. The most commonly proposed 
alternative is the WTO subsidies regime, and more specifically, the prohibition on export 
subsidies. It appears almost as though in the fear of creating overlapping jurisdictions 
between the two organizations and cross-conditionality for their members, the drafters 
might have in fact gone too far in the other direction, creating a loophole in international 
economic law, which is now being attempted to be filled in by stretching the interpretation 
of other provisions. 
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6 WTO Provisions on Subsidies 
6.1 General 
Although the only provision that explicitly deals with exchange arrangements is GATT 
XV, it might be possible to challenge exchange rate undervaluation through the WTO 
dispute settlement system under a few other provisions. The two most commonly 
mentioned articles currency undervaluation could be deemed to breach are GATT Article 
II, by nullifying the effects of tariff concessions, and the general prohibition on export 
subsidies, which is codified in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
Since it is the most debated alternative, this paper will concentrate on whether an 
undervalued currency could be challenged as a prohibited export subsidy. Before analyzing 
in detail whether currency undervaluation could fulfill the criteria of a prohibited export 
subsidy, the history and general structure of the WTO provisions on subsidies will be given 
a cursory glance. 
The two GATT provisions on subsidies can be found in Articles VI (anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties) and XVI (subsidies). The GATT’s a  r ach    su si ies  as 
relatively lenient, condemning only subsidies that were used in such a way as to cause 
material injury to the industry of another member state. Article XVI:4 provided for the 
gradual elimination of export subsidies for non-primary products.
153
 The most problematic 
aspect of the GATT provisions on subsidies was the absence of any form of definition of a 
subsidy. This was resolved only in 1995, which the establishment of the WTO and the 
introduction of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
154
 
The SCMA not only provided a definition for the term subsidy, but also divided subsidies 
into three categories (prohibited, actionable and non-actionable) and introduced detailed 
provisions on the administration of countervailing duties. As the Panel stated in Japan – 
DRAMS CVDs, the purpose of the SCMA is to apply and interpret the rules of the GATT 
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subsidy provisions and "elaborate rules for the application of GATT Articles on subsidies 
and dumping in order to provide greater uniformity and certainty in their 
implementation".
155
 Both agreements are integral parts of the WTO Agreement and 
constitute an inseparable package of rights and obligations, and must therefore be read in 
conjunction.
156
 Accordingly, after the SCMA came into force, GATT rules on subsidies 
can no longer be invoked independently.
157
 
6.2 Prohibited and Actionable Subsidies 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures introduced the concepts of 
prohibited, actionable and non-actionable subsidies. The provisions regarding non-
actionable subsidies were subject to review after 5 years, and since they were not renewed 
in 2000, all subsidies now fall under the category of either actionable or prohibited 
subsidies.
158
 
The SCMA introduced two types of prohibited subsidies: local content subsidies and 
export subsidies. Article 3.1(a) prohibits subsidies that are contingent, either in law or in 
fact, upon export performance, whereas 3.2(b) prohibits subsidies that are contingent upon 
the use of domestic over imported goods. These subsidies are irrebuttably presumed to 
distort trade and are prohibited as such, which means that there is no need to demonstrate 
that they have adverse effects on trade. Actionable subsidies are generally permitted, but 
can be challenged if they are specific in the sense of Article 2 and cause adverse effects on 
trade.  
6.3 Remedies 
Both prohibited and actionable subsidies may be challenged either through the unilateral 
imposition of countervailing duties or through the multilateral dispute settlement 
procedure. If a subsidy is challenged via the multilateral system and deemed a prohibited 
subsidy, it must be withdrawn without delay and within the timeframe recommended by 
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the panel.
159
 In the event that the state does not remove the prohibited subsidy within the 
time-period given, the Dispute Settlement Body may grant the complaining party the right 
to take appropriate countermeasures.
160
 If the panel deems the subsidy an actionable 
subsidy with adverse trade effects, it can be either withdrawn or its adverse effects 
removed by taking countermeasures. 
In order to unilaterally impose countervailing duties, the state challenging the measure 
must conduct an in-depth investigation in order to prove that the subsidized imports are 
causing injury to its domestic industry. The SCMA provides for detailed requirements 
regarding the conducting of the investigation, the calculation of the benefit granted by the 
subsidy, as well the determination of injury and the causal link between the subsidy and its 
effects on domestic industries.
161
 
7 Definition of a Subsidy 
7.1 General 
One of the important novelties of the SCMA was the introduction of the definition of a 
su si    Artic e 1  u cti  s as a “ ate a ” t  the A ree e t  i  the se se that i   r er   r 
the provisions of the Agreement to apply to a certain measure, that measure must fall under 
the definition of a subsidy provided in Article 1. In order to fulfill this definition, there 
must be 1) a financial contribution or income or price support from the government and 2) 
a benefit must thereby be conferred to 3) a limited group of recipients (specificity 
requirement). These elements are cumulative, and must all be present simultaneously in 
order for a subsidy in the sense of the SCMA to exist. 
As will now be examined in more detail, it is extremely unlikely that currency 
undervaluation could be deemed to fulfill all three criteria of a subsidy. 
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7.2 Financial Contribution or Income or Price Support 
7.2.1 Financial Contribution 
7.2.1.1 General 
The first criterion of a subsidy is that there is a financial contribution (or income or price 
support) from the government. Article 1.1(a)(1) lists four different forms of financial 
contribution: i) direct transfer of funds or potential direct transfer of funds, ii) government 
revenue otherwise due that is foregone or not collected, iii) government provided services 
or goods, and iv) a private body being entrusted by the government to perform one or more 
of the first three functions listed. 
The list of financial contributions provided in the article is exhaustive. This is clear from 
the actual wording of the article and has also been confirmed in case law.
162
 However, the 
items have been interpreted very broadly and cover a wide range of government measures, 
as examined in more detail below. 
7.2.1.2 Government or any public body 
According to Article 1.1(a)(1), the financial contribution must be from the government or 
any public body. In the case of an undervalued currency, the measures giving rise to the 
undervaluation are most often taken by the state’s ce tra   a       Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, the Panel ruled that the Export-Import Bank of Korea is a public body based on 
the fact that it the Korean government has control over its decision-making. Although the 
finding that any entity controlled by the government is a public body was subsequently 
reversed by the Appellate Body in the case US – CVDs (China)  a state’s ce tral bank 
would most likely be considered a public body even following the new interpretation of the 
term given by the Appellate Body.  
In the case US – CVDs (China), the Appellate Body differentiated between the term 
"government" in the narrow sense and the term in a collective sense, which refers 
collectively to the "government or any public body". In the SCM Agreement, the term 
"government" is used in the collective sense and therefore refers to both the government in 
the narrow sense as well as any public body.   The Appellate Body also examined what 
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"essential characteristics" an entity must have in order to be part of the government in the 
collective sense. The conclusion reached was that a "public body within the meaning of 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement must be an entity that possesses, exercises or is 
vested with governmental authority". The Appellate Body stressed that the characteristics 
of a public body vary from state to state and case to case, and the determination of whether 
an entity fulfi  s the  e i iti   sh u    e  ase     a  e a uati      the e tit ’s c re 
features and its relationship with the government in the narrow sense.
163
 
The i stituti  s i   e e ti   a state’s curre c   ractice   u   t  a   a  eara ces  u  i   
this definition and  e c  si ere   art    the “   er  e t” i  the c   ecti e se se. 
7.2.1.3 Direct transfer of funds 
The first form of financial contribution is when a government practice involves a direct 
transfer of funds, e.g. grants, loans and equity infusions. The term direct transfer of funds 
has been interpreted widely in WTO case law, and has covered for example debt-for-equity 
swaps and modifications of loan repayment terms
164
 as well as share transfers
165
, in 
addition to actual payments. 
The forms of direct transfer of funds cited (grants, loans and equity infusions) are given as 
examples and serve to show that measures that are similar to these are also covered by the 
provision. The Appellate Body has also stated that the concept of direct transfer of funds 
should not be interpreted in a manner too literal and mechanistic, and that it is not confined 
to situations where there is an incremental flow of funds to the recipient that enhances the 
reci ie t’s  et   rth 166 
Even so, it is extremely unlikely that an undervalued currency could be deemed to fit under 
subparagraph (i) of Article 1.1(a)(1). Firstly, there appears to be no government transaction 
similar to a grant, loan or equity infusion. It has been argued that an undervalued currency 
amounts to a direct transfer of funds because of the higher amount of domestic currency an 
exporter gets in exchange for its foreign currency. The amount of funds would be equal to 
the difference in the amount of domestic units of currency the exporter gets according to 
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the undervalued exchange rate and the amount it would get if the exchange were calculated 
according to a hypothetical non-manipulated exchange rate. However, the transfer of funds 
 ust  e  irect   hich ea s “ ith ut i ter e i    act rs  r i ter e iaries”.167 Since it is 
not the government itself exchanging the currency, but private banks, the transfer of funds 
cannot be deemed direct in this sense. Moreover, the entities exchanging the currency are 
merely doing so based on the exchange rate that has already been manipulated as a result 
of other measures taken by the government.
168
  
Manipulation of the exchange rate is achieved by influencing the amount of foreign and/or 
domestic currency on the currency market by purchasing or selling foreign and/or domestic 
currency. For example in the case of China, the undervaluation of the RMB is 
accomplished by issuing RMB and purchasing large amounts of foreign currency, namely 
US dollars, in order to alleviate pressure to appreciate the RMB.
169
 These measures 
actually causing undervaluation of the exchange rate are taken directly by the government 
and must be separated from the actual act of exchanging currency, which is put into action 
by private banks and confers a benefit to domestic exporters. Therefore currency 
undervaluation does not fulfill the element of financial contribution in the form of a direct 
transfer of funds. 
7.2.1.4 Government provided services 
Since challenging currency manipulation as government revenue otherwise due that is 
foregone or not collected is extremely far-fetched, the next item to be examine in more 
detail is item (iii) of Article 1.1(a)(1). According to item (iii) a financial contribution exists 
when the government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure. It has 
been discussed whether currency undervaluation could constitute a government provided 
                                                 
167
 Dicti  ar   e i iti      “ irect”  r           r  icti  aries c    accesse     4   13  
168
 Jung, Hanuel: ‘Tackling Currency Manipulation with International Law: Why and How Currency 
Manipulation should be Adjudicated?’, Vol. 9 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, Issue 2 
(2012) at 190. 
169
 According to former Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department of the IMF, Michael 
Mussa, Chinese authorities purchased $1 trillion over the time-span of 2002-2007, preventing the RMB from 
appreciating and causing thus a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the RMB. See Mussa, 
Michael: ‘ M  Sur ei  a ce   er Chi a’s E change Rate Policy’  aper presented at the Conference on 
China's Exchange Rate Policy Peterson Institute 19 October 2007, available at 
http://iie.com/publications/papers/mussa1007.pdf  at 3. 
50 
 
service in the meaning that it saves exporters from the need to hedge against foreign 
exchange losses.
170
 The problems with this argument are manifold.  
Firstly, an interpretation of this kind could be widened to mean that any kind of exchange 
regime other than a freely floating currency that reduces exchange rate risks would be 
considered a governmental service in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii).
171
 As Zimmermann 
states  “it is sa e t  c  c u e that such a  i ter retation would go well beyond the intended 
sc  e”    the artic e.172 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is difficult to argue how an exchange arrangement is 
  t  art    “ e era  i  rastructure”  Dictionary definitions of the word infrastructure 
include “the u  er  i    asic  ra e  r   as    a s ste   r  r a izati   ” a   
“i sta  ati  s a   ser ices … re ar e  as the ec    ic   u  ati      a c u tr ”.173 
Curre c  arra  e e ts are  ith ut a   u t  art    a c u tr ’s   etar  i  rastructure a   
regarded as the economic foundation of a country. 
The term general infrastructure has been interpreted in detail by the panel in the case EC – 
Aircraft.
174
 Acc r i   t  the  a e ’s rea i    the e iste ce    de jure or de facto limitations 
on access to or use of infrastructure is essential in determining whether it is “ e era ” 
infrastructure or not, although also other considerations can be taken into account.
175
 In the 
case of currency undervaluation, it is indisputable that access to the exchange rate is not 
limited in any way, but rather is available to (and obligatory for) everyone. The fact that 
exporters are the ones actually gaining benefits from it is not relevant in the evaluation of 
whether a financial contribution under Article 1.1(a)(1) exists. 
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7.2.1.5 Private body entrusted to perform functions (i)-(iii) 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) is in essence an anti-circumvention provision that was introduced in 
order to prevent member states from escaping responsibility for their actions by delegating 
functions listed in (i)-(iii) to private bodies.
176
 It covers situations where a government 
makes payments to a funding mechanism or uses a private body as a proxy in order to 
make a financial contribution.
177
 
It might be possible to argue that in the case of currency undervaluation, private banks are 
entrusted by the government to exchange currency at an undervalued rate which gives rise 
to a financial contribution. The issue with this interpretation is that it would first have to be 
determined that the exchange of currency constitutes one of the forms of financial 
contribution listed in subparagraphs (i)-(iii). In the hypothetical situation that the panel was 
t   ee  that a state’s curre c  a i u ati   resu te  i  a  i a cia  c  tri uti   i    e  r 
more of the forms listed in (i)-(iii), it would most probably come to the conclusion that 
private-owned banks exchanging currency at the undervalued exchange rate would fulfill 
the definition of indirect financial contribution in the sense of subparagraph (iv). However, 
as has just examined in the paragraphs above, it is extremely unlikely that a panel was to 
deem a financial contribution to exist in any form.  
7.2.2 Distinction between financial contribution and benefit 
The important distinction between the concepts of financial contribution and benefit has 
been stressed numerous times by both the panel and the Appellate Body178 and must be 
kept in mind when determining whether a government measure constitutes any of the 
forms of financial contribution listed in Article 1.1(a)(1). The two are distinctly separate 
legal elements which together determine whether a subsidy exists.
179
 
The Appellate Body stated in the case US – Softwood Lumber IV that the drafters of the 
SCMA i tr  uce  the   ti      “ i a cia  c  tri uti  ” a    i ite  its  e i iti   t  the 
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exhaustive list constituted by subparagraphs (i)-(iv) in order to foreclose the possibility of 
treating any government action that resulted in a benefit as a subsidy.
180
 
The most important difference between these two legal elements is that the existence of 
benefit is determined by the effects of a measure, whereas the determination of the 
existence of a financial contribution is centered on the nature of the government action. As 
the panel stated in US – Export Restraints, to “hold that the concept of financial 
contribution is about the effects, rather than the nature, of a government action would be 
effectively to write it out of the Agreement, leaving the concepts of benefit and specificity 
as the sole determinants of the scope of the Agreement”.181 
A lot of the arguments stating that an undervalued currency constitutes a financial 
contribution seem to do just this. They concentrate on the effects of the undervalued 
exchange rate, ignoring the nature of the government actions giving rise to the 
undervaluation. 
7.2.3 Income or Price Support 
Acc r i   t  Artic e 1 1 a      a su si   ca  a s   e the resu t    “a     r     i c  e  r 
 rice su   rt i  the se se    Artic e XV     the GATT 1994”  GATT Artic e XV  Secti   
A deals with subsidies (including any form of income or price support) which operate 
directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to decrease imports of any 
product into, its territory. Unfortunately neither the GATT nor the SCMA provides any 
further form of guidance regarding the meaning of this term. 
At first glance this provision could seem to cover situations such as currency 
undervaluation, which clearly operate indirectly to increase exports from and reduce 
imports into the state manipulating its currency. Support for this interpretation could be 
found in the c   e t    the A  e  ate B    stati   that the c  ce t    “i c  e  r  rice 
su   rt”  r a e s the scope of measures that can be considered subsidies beyond those 
that constitute financial contributions under Article 1.1(a)(1).
182
  
However, in the case China – GOES  the  a e  c  c u e  that the ter  “ rice su   rt”  
read in its context of Article 1.1 of the SCMA, suggests a rather narrow interpretation of 
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the term. In interpreting the term, the panel commenced from the dictionary definition 
given in Blacks Oxford Dictionary of Economics, which states that price support includes 
“   er  e t    icies t   ee  the  r  ucer  rices … a   e s  e i i u   e e ”.183 The 
panel then referred to the ruling in the case US – Export Restrictions, in which the 
important “ ate a ” r  e    the ter  “ i a cia  c  tri uti  ” i  the SCMA a   the 
important distinction between financial contribution and benefit were brought up. The 
panel in China – GOES quoted the ruling of the panel in US – Export Restrictions, 
stressing that the concept of financial contribution is not about the effects, but the nature of 
the action  Base     this reas  i    the  a e  state  that the ter  “ rice su   rt” a s  
functions as a gateway to the SCMA and found that the term does not include all 
government intervention that may have an effect on prices.
184
 The panel also went on to 
e a i e the c  ce t    “ ar et  rice su   rt” i c u e  i  the A ree e t    A ricu ture  
Price support in the sense of this agreement requires a direct form of government control 
over domestic prices and does not cover the movement in prices being a mere side effect of 
another form of government intervention.
185
 
Taking into consideration this ruling and using analogy to apply it to the ter  “income 
support” as well as price support, it would be logical to conclude that the concept    “a   
  r     i c  e  r  rice su   rt” i  the se se    Artic e 1 1 a     is not wide enough to 
c  er the e  ects    a state’s curre c  u  er a uati    If the term is to be interpreted in 
accordance with the  a e ’s ru i    a   there  re har   i us    ith the i ter retati      
the concept of financial contribution), the determination of whether a government measure 
constitutes income or price support should be based on the nature, not the effects, of the 
government action increasing exports and decreasing imports. Government actions 
bringing about currency undervaluation are not aimed at setting domestic producer prices 
or income above a minimum level, and therefore they cannot be considered income or 
price support despite the effects they have on trade flows. 
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7.3 Benefit 
The second criterion of the definition of a subsidy is that a benefit is conferred to the 
recipient of the financial contribution (or income or price support).
186
 According to the 
case law interpretation of benefit, emphasis should be put on what has been conferred to 
the recipient, rather than possible costs to the government.
187
 
It has been established that a benefit exists when the financial contribution makes the 
reci ie t “ etter    ” tha  it would have been without the financial contribution. According 
to the Appellate Body in the case Canada - Aircraft, the appropriate basis for comparison 
i   eter i i    hether  r   t the  i a cia  a es the reci ie t “ etter    ” is the 
marketplace. Therefore, a benefit is deemed to exist when the recipient receives the 
financial contribution on conditions that are more advantageous than those available on the 
market.
188
 This has later been upheld in numerous other cases by both the panel and the 
Appellate Body.
189
 
A clear example of this would be a dual exchange rate regime in which exporters are 
a    e  t  e cha  e their   rei   curre c     r e a   e  ith the state’s ce tra   a    at a 
rate that is more advantageous than the exchange rate applied on the free currency market. 
In a system of this kind, the benefit would be the difference in the amount of units of 
domestic currency exporters got in exchange for their foreign currency from the central 
bank, and the amount of units of domestic currency they would get if they were to 
exchange their foreign currency on the free currency market. The problem in the case of 
currency undervaluation is that the government measures that allegedly give rise to the 
financial contribution have done so by altering the exchange rate available on the market.  
In the recent case EC – Aircraft, the Appellate Body stated that in order for the comparison 
re ar i    hether the  i a cia  c  tri uti   has a e the reci ie t ‘ etter    ’ t   e 
meaningful, the benchmark that is used to determine whether the recipient is "better off" 
must not itself be distorted by the financial contribution. Rather, the benchmark must 
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reflect conditions in the market "absent the contribution". Otherwise, it would not be 
possible to determine whether the financial contribution placed the recipient in an 
advantageous position, because the benchmark used in the comparison itself reflects the 
financial contribution.
190
 
In the case of currency undervaluation, in order to establish whether or not a benefit exists, 
one would have to determine an undistorted benchmark exchange rate. It would have to be 
proved that the actual exchange rate is indeed undervalued, and to do this one would have 
to calculate what the exchange rate would be absent the government interventions taken to 
manipulate it. This would not be an easy feat. First of all, one would have to determine the 
level of interventions at which normal government policies become currency manipulation, 
since all forms of exchange arrangements, except freely floating ones, require some sort of 
government intervention. Secondly, an economic analysis of the precise amount of 
undervaluation would have to take into consideration a large number of factors that are 
constantly changing, making the calculation extremely complicated and variable to say the 
least. This is well illustrated by the fact that estimates of the undervaluation of the Chinese 
renminbi vary from 20-40 per cent.
191
 
There are many different methods that can be used to calculate an equilibrium exchange 
rate, all of which produce somewhat differing results. It has been argued by some scholars 
that this would be a positive aspect in a hypothetical WTO dispute: the more methods can 
be used, the more evidence there is of the misalignment between the exchange rate and its 
equilibrium value, and it would be up to the panel or Appellate Body to make the final 
judgment regarding the level of undervaluation.
192
 
At first thought it seems undeniable that exporters benefit from the undervalued exchange 
rate, and the only problems would be related to the calculation of the benefit. However, 
even this has been questioned by academics. Staiger and Sykes state that “    e e it e ists 
i   rices ha e a juste  t  e i i ate a   rea  e  ects    the  ractice ”193 Koops points out that 
the conferral of benefit is also dependent on firm-specific production structures. If the firm 
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needs imports (e.g. raw materials or fuel) in order to produce the products that are 
exported, no benefit exists.
194
 The reason for this is that the two effects of currency 
undervaluation, cheap exports and expensive imports, ultimately cancel each other out. 
7.4 Specificity 
In order to fall under the provisions of the SCMA, a subsidy must also fulfill the third 
criterion of specificity. According to Article 2, a subsidy shall be deemed to be specific if it 
is limited to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries, or to a group of 
enterprises located within a certain geographical region. According to Article 2.3, a 
subsidy is also automatically deemed specific if it falls under Article 3 as a prohibited 
subsidy. Since an undervalued currency is applied to all enterprises and industries within 
the territory of the state, the first form of specificity clearly does not come into question. 
Therefore, in order to fulfill the specificity criterion, an undervalued currency would have 
to constitute a prohibited export subsidy in the sense of Article 3.1(a). 
8 Prohibited Export Subsidies 
8.1 Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
Article 3.1(a) prohibits subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance, 
including those illustrated in Annex I. A subsidy in the form of any of the items listed in 
the illustrative list of Annex I is automatically prohibited, and there is no need to 
demonstrate that it fulfills the conditionality requirement of 3.1(a).
195
 The illustrative list 
includes eleven different forms of export subsidies, but does not mention undervalued 
exchange rates. Several authors have asserted that the fact that such a well-known form of 
export promotion has been left out of the illustrative list must be taken to mean that it was 
not intended to be included in the scope of the WTO provisions on subsidies.
196
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Considering that the list is illustrative and therefore not exhaustive, this seems like a rather 
radical interpretation. As stated by the Appellate Body in Canada – Autos, omissions have 
different meanings in different contexts, and the fact that something is omitted does not 
necessarily mean that it was not intended to be included in the scope of the provision.
197
 
Taking into consideration the context of the illustrative list as examples of export subsidies, 
it is rather safe to say that the omission of exchange rate undervaluation from the list does 
not directly exclude the possibility that an undervalued currency could constitute an export 
subsidy prohibited under Article 3.1(a). As Zimmermann points out, the drafters of the 
SCMA could have had many reasons not to include an explicit mention of exchange rate 
policies, seeing as they are politically a very sensitive issue.
198
 Since there is no negotiating 
history that would shed light on what the reasons for leaving out exchange rates were (or 
whether they were discussed at all), no definite conclusions can be made on the basis of 
Annex I. 
This being said, in EC – Aircraft  the A  e  ate B      u   that “a c       eature    the 
examples provided in most of the items of the illustrative list in Annex I is that the subsidy 
gives certain advantages to exported products and favours exported products over products 
 esti e    r    estic c  su  ti  ”.199  It went on to state that export-contingent subsidies 
 a  ur a reci ie t’s e   rt sa es   er its    estic sa es  These c ari icati  s su   rt the 
interpretation that an undervalued exchange rate that results in benefits for exporters fits 
under the rationale of Art. 3.1(a).  
There are two items in particular which are similar in their effects to an undervalued 
currency, items (b) and (j). Item (b) mentions currency retention schemes or any similar 
practices which involve a bonus on exports. According to Siegel, a currency retention 
sche e “usua    i     es a    i   certai  e   rters t  retai  a   rti      their   rei   
exchange earnings notwithstanding a general rule for residents to surrender receipts of 
foreign excha  e … i  e cha  e   r   ca  curre c ”.200 Although this is clearly not the 
case i  the ai tai i      a  u  er a ue  e cha  e rate    ic   the a  iti      “a   
si i ar  ractices  hich i     e a    us    e   rts”   es  i e  the ite  i  e i ite    A  
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undervalued exchange rate certainly involves a bonus on exports, but whether it could be 
considered a practice similar to a currency retention scheme is doubtful. 
Item (j) prohibits the granting of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes that 
ensure exports against exchange rate risks at premium rates which are inadequate to cover 
the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes. As argued above, an 
undervalued exchange rate protects exporters against fluctuations in the value of their 
domestic currency and therefore saves them from the need to hedge against foreign 
exchange losses. Since this is a result of the exchange rate policy of the state, it is provided 
to exporters free of charge and therefore, it could be said, at a premium rate. The long-term 
operating costs and losses of maintaining an undervalued exchange rate, however, are 
extremely difficult (if not impossible) to calculate. Moreover, it would be quite a stretch to 
 ee  a  e cha  e rate    ic  as a  “e   rt cre it  uara tee  r i sura ce  r  ra  e”   t is 
unlikely that a panel would interpret this item to include government actions which are not 
the services meant, but rather have the effect of rending such services redundant. 
Because currency undervaluation does not fall directly under any of the items listed in 
Annex I, it is necessary to examine whether it fulfills the criteria of an export subsidy set in 
Article 3.1(a) of the SCMA. 
8.2 De Facto and De Jure Export Contingency 
Article 3.1(a) prohibits subsidies that are contingent, either in fact or in law, upon export 
performance, whether solely or as one of several other conditions. As stated by the 
Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft  the  e    r  i  this  r  isi   is ”c  ti  e t”   hich 
 ea s “c   iti  a ”  r “ e e  e t   r its e iste ce    s  ethi   e se”.201 The criterion of 
contingency is the same for both de jure and de facto export contingency, the only 
difference being in the sort of evidence that can be used to prove contingency upon export. 
In the case of de jure contingency, proof can be found in the actual wording of the relevant 
legislation, regulation or other legal instrument, whereas in the case of de facto 
contingency no such written proof exists. For this reason, contingency in fact upon export 
 er  r a ce “ ust  e i  erre   rom the total configuration of the facts constituting and 
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surrounding the granting of the subsidy, none of which on its own is likely to be decisive in 
a    i e  case” 202 
In the case of currency undervaluation, de jure export contingency can essentially be ruled 
out.
203
 A h   thetica   a e ’s e a uati       hether a  u  er a ue  curre c  c  stitutes a 
prohibited export subsidy would most likely concentrate on the determination of whether 
the standard of de facto contingency is met. 
8.3 Evaluation of De Facto Contingency 
Footnote 4 to Article 3.1(a) provides that the standard of de facto contingency is met when 
“the  acts  e   strate that the  ra ti      a su si     ith ut ha i    ee  a e  e a    
contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or 
e   rt ear i  s”  The sec    se te ce    the    t  te c  ti ues    s eci  i   that “the 
mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason 
alone be considered to be an export subsidy within the ea i      this  r  isi   ”  
As the Appellate Body clarified in Canada – Aircraft, the standard set in footnote 4 
requires the existence of three distinct elements: 1) the granting of a subsidy 2) is tied to 3) 
actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings
204
. 
The first element requires simply that the focus of the inquiry be on the granting authority 
and not the recipient.
 As   r the sec    e e e t  the   r s “tie  t ” e  hasize the 
relationship of conditionality between the granting of the subsidy and export. The granting 
auth rit ’s anticipation that exports would result from the granting of the subsidy is not 
sufficient to fulfill this requirement; the granting of the subsidy must be contingent upon 
either actual or anticipated exports.
205
 According to the Appellate Body, the second 
sentence of the footnote serves to demonstrate this element. The third element, actual or 
anticipated exportation, must be kept separate from the second element of conditionality. 
“A tici ate  e   rtati  ”   es   t signify that the element is fulfilled by examining the 
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 ra ti   auth rit ’s expectations of exports, but rather based on an examination of 
objective evidence.
206
 
In EC – Aircraft, the Appellate Body established a test for the determination of whether a 
subsidy is contingent in fact upon export performance. According to the Appellate Body, 
assessment could be based on the comparison of the ratio between exports and domestic 
sales when the subsidy is granted and the same ratio in the absence of the subsidy in 
question. If the comparison shows that, all other things equal, the granting of the subsidy 
incentivizes exports in such a manner that a profit maximizing firm prefers to export 
instead of sell its products on the domestic market, this would be considered evidence that 
the subsidy is tied to anticipated exportation.
207
 
In order to benefit from an undervalued exchange rate a producer must export, because by 
exporting it receives foreign currency which it can then convert into domestic currency at 
the preferential exchange rate. Moreover, undervalued exchange rates are more often than 
  t s eci ica    use  as  art    a state’s export promotion strategy, due to the fact that an 
undervalued currency increases exports. Based on these arguments, an undervalued 
currency would seem to fulfill the elements of de facto export contingency. However, it 
has been pointed out that it is possible to benefit from an undervalued exchange rate also 
 ith ut e   rti      r e a   e   rei   i  est e ts i t  the c u tr  a   the c u tr ’s     
tourism sector also benefit from the exchange rate.
208
 For this reason it is rather unlikely 
that a panel would find that an undervalued currency constitutes a subsidy contingent in 
fact upon export performance. 
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9 Proposals for Action 
Based on the analysis presented above, challenging currency undervaluation under the 
provisions of the SCMA would be very unlikely to succeed for a multitude of reasons. 
Firstly, currency undervaluation seemingly fails to fulfill the three cumulative criteria of a 
subsidy set in Article 1 of the SCMA. The most problematic of the three is the criterion of 
a financial contribution or income or price support, which strictly speaking does not exist 
in the case of currency undervaluation, but also the element of benefit is questionable. 
Even if the existence of a benefit could be proven it would be close to impossible to 
calculate and therefore the amount of subsidy granted could never be more than an 
estimate at best. As for the requirement of specificity, it could only be fulfilled if it were 
proven that the subsidy granted was contingent upon export and since an undervalued 
currency benefits not only exporters but also for example foreign investors and the tourism 
sector, this element is not fulfilled.  
Moreover, widening the interpretation of the provisions of the SCMA to cover situations of 
currency undervaluation could set an undesired precedent for future cases related to 
currency issues and upset the balance between the WTO and IMF. This argument holds 
also in relation to other WTO provisions that could possibly be interpreted in such a 
manner as to encompass currency undervaluation. The obvious problem with widening the 
scope of provisions in this manner is that in accordance with Article 3.2 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, the panel or Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations of members. In the case of currency undervaluation, widening the 
interpretation of WTO provisions would not only add to the obligations of members, but 
also move into the territory of monetary sovereignty. As Ju     i ts  ut  “a  ai er t  a 
state’s s  erei   ri ht sh u     t  e a e i   icit    ith ut c   i ci   e i e ce that the 
state’s acce te  i ter ati  a     i ati   actua    i c u es such  ai er” 209 
Possible solutions to the problem are many, suggestions ranging from leaving the matter 
completely to the IMF
210
 or adapting and improving cooperation between the WTO and 
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IMF
211
 to negotiating an entirely new agreement regulating currency manipulation
212
. 
Some have even gone so far as to propose the establishment of a completely new 
organization, the World Financial Authority.
213
 
As for the first proposal, it seems that after decades of doing relatively nothing about the 
problem of the trade effects of currency manipulation, the IMF has woken up to the 
problem and commenced action in order to find a solution. In 2007, thirty years after the 
 irst Bi atera  Sur ei  a ce Decisi    the  u  ’s E ecuti e B ar  a   te  a  e   ecisi   
on bilateral surveillance over members’    icies. The  M ’s Public Information Notice on 
the  ecisi   state  that the  e   ecisi   “ ri  s  reater c arit  a   s eci icit  t   hat 
exchange rate policies countries should avoid and when these policies may be of concern 
t  the i ter ati  a  c   u it ”  According to the Public Information Notice, the new 
 ecisi   “c ari ies the c  ce t    e cha  e rate a i u ati   i   r er t   ai  a  u  air 
c   etiti e a  a ta e   er  ther e  ers   hich is  r hi ite  u  er Artic e  V” a   a s  
“a  s a  ri ci  e rec   e  i   that e  ers avoid exchange rate policies that result in 
external instability, regardless of their purpose, thereby capturing exchange rate policies 
that ha e  r  e  t   e a aj r s urce    i sta i it    er the  ast  eca es”  214 The 
novelties introduced by the 2007 Bilateral Surveillance Decision are discussed in more 
detail above in section 3.2.   
Although the new decision can be considered as a move in the right direction because it 
has turned the focus to exchange rates and may well serve to strengthen surveillance, it 
does not resolve the underlying problem. The guidelines provided in the decision bring 
nothing new to the past practice of surveillance, and the IMF Articles of Agreement remain 
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unchanged.
215
 The inherent problems of Article IV(1)(iii), which have been discussed 
above, remain unaffected. A more viable option might therefore be the amendment of 
Article IV(1)(iii). However, it would take three fifths of the IMF members having 85 per 
cent of the total voting power in order to effectively amend the Articles of Agreement.
216
 
Considering how reluctant states are to give up aspects of their monetary sovereignty, this 
seems highly unlikely in the present political and economic climate. The fact that during 
the US-China dispute, states have systematically opted to strive for a diplomatic 
solution,
217
 instead of calling actively   r a  a e   e t    the  M ’s Artic es    
Agreement, can be seen as an indication of this. Moreover, Zimmermann argues that even 
modifying Article IV(1)(iii) so that it no longer included a subjective element would not 
 ri   a s  uti   t  the  r   e : “[E] e   ith that s rt      i ie  ru e  the  M    u   
likely not proceed to a formal finding of breach immediately after establishing that one of 
its members is manipulating its exchange rate in a way that produces one or several 
 r hi ite  resu ts” 218  
Mattoo and Subramanian propose another solution: amending WTO rules in order to 
include exchange rate regulation under the scope of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
The two conditions to be met would be 1) a clear finding of currency undervaluation and 2) 
proof that it is attributable to governmental action.
219
 The system Mattoo and Subramanian 
describe is very similar to the existing one regarding restrictions taken for balance of 
payments reasons. In the sa e a  er  the  M ’s i  ut   u    e  i ite  t  a tech ica  
determination at the request of the panel, based on which the panel would then make its 
decision on whether a breach of the WTO provisions exists.
220
 This system would make it 
possible to “harness the comparative advantage of the two institutions, with the WTO 
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providing the valuable enforcement mechanism and the IMF providing the essential 
technical expertise to this enforcement process” 221 The obvious question that arises is why 
would states be willing to make this addition to WTO provisions if they do not wish to 
have the issue addressed effectively under the IMF? For example Zimmermann has pointed 
 ut that it see s “  re tha  just u  i e  ” that such a ru e c u    e  e  tiate  u  er the 
WTO given the fact that Chi a a rea     jecte  t  the  M ’s    7 Bi atera  Sur ei  a ce 
Decision, which was able to be passed only because China did not have the power to 
veto.
222
 The answer provided by Mattoo and Subramanian is that the rule would be added 
as part of a larger package of negotiations on various issues and the members against such 
an addition would have the bargaining power to demand concessions in return.
223
 
Whereas in the United States internal political forces have initiated several administrative 
and legislative proposals, which so far have led to no action being taken, Brazil has been 
systematically calling for WTO members to address currency undervaluation under the 
WTO. The i teresti   as ect i  Brazi ’s case is that it sees the United States, so clearly the 
accuser in the China case, as the perpetrator. Brazil argues that the policy of quantitative 
easing
224
 implemented by the United States depreciates the value of the U.S. dollar, thus 
causing the value of the Brazilian currency to rise and making it difficult for Brazil to 
export. Brazi ’s  r   sa  is a t  -pillared program that focuses first on understanding the 
connection between international trade and exchange rates and secondly on international 
institutions and the possibilities for states to seek redress under their auspices. What Brazil 
proposes is the creation of a specific trade remedy that could be used to neutralize the 
harmful effects of currency undervaluation.
 225
 Although Brazil has been successful with 
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regard to the first pillar of its program, the suggestion of an exchange-rate trade remedy 
has been met by the international community with aversion.
226
 
The only aspect academics and politicians alike seem to agree on is that the current 
situation is unsustainable, and something needs to be done or states will continue to exploit 
the  e a  “    h  e”  causi   seri us tra e i  a a ces a   u  er i i   the e  ects    the 
WTO agreements. 
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10 Conclusion 
The currency dispute between the USA and China has shown that, even in accentuated 
situations where big numbers are at stake, states seem to be unwilling to pursue anything 
but diplomatic channels in the fight against currency manipulation. This could be for 
several reasons; out of respect for the monetary sovereignty of states and the reluctance to 
strain diplomatic and commercial relations, or perhaps even out of fear of spending 
millions on a WTO dispute, the outcome of which is uncertain at best. 
The problems in adjudicating currency manipulation essentially arise from historical 
developments and the failure to adapt the instruments of international law to a new 
economic reality. This, together with the fear of overlapping jurisdictions between 
international institutions has led to a loophole in international economic law. Initially the 
division of authority between the WTO and the IMF was clear: exchange rate issues under 
the par value system were a matter to be dealt with exclusively within the IMF. After the 
breakdown of the par value system, misuse of monetary policies became easier and more 
frequent, but nothing was done to reinforce the authority of the IMF. This has led to a 
situation where the IMF has the jurisdiction to deal with exchange rate issues, but lacks an 
effective enforcement mechanism to ensure that its rulings are followed. The WTO on the 
other hand has at its disposal an extremely effective dispute resolution mechanism but 
lacks jurisdiction regarding currency issues.  
At present, neither the IMF nor the WTO rules seem to be able to provide an answer to the 
problem of currency undervaluation. Although the IMF Articles of Agreement contain a 
hard obligation to avoid currency manipulation, the provision is worded in a manner that 
makes it impossible to apply in practice. The rules of the WTO agreements, on the other 
hand, were originally not drafted to deal with currency matters, because they are not 
included in the  r a izati  ’s juris icti  . Although the interpretation of more than just 
one WTO provision could perhaps be stretched to cover currency undervaluation, it would 
be unwise to leave such a drastic expansion of WTO jurisdiction to the decision of the 
dispute settlement body. Such a decision would also constitute a dangerous precedent, 
opening the floodgates for all kinds of disputes related to currency matters. Without a 
mandate to address such matters, and lacking provisions specifically drafted to do so, the 
issue would be left almost entirely to the discretion of the panel and Appellate Body, which 
67 
 
does not seem a commendable solution and would certainly not be to the liking of 
members of most members of the WTO. 
The issue of currency undervaluation requires a sustainable solution that would resolve the 
matter conclusively and prevent states from exploiting the international monetary system at 
the expense of international trade. Seeing as conflicting interests of various states and the 
states’ fear of having to give up further aspects of their monetary sovereignty make it 
impossible at present to amend either the rules of the IMF or the WTO or to draft a whole 
new agreement addressing the matter, perhaps the most viable option would be to turn to 
instruments of soft law, at least for the time being. 
